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ACERSA Association pour la certification de la santé animale (France) 
AD Aujeszky's disease 
AHAW Animal Health and Welfare panel 
APP Actinobacillus pleuropneumoniae 
BoHV-1 Bovine herpesvirus type 1 
BVD Bovine virus diarrhea 
CSF Classical swine fever 
DIVA Differentiate infected from vaccinated animals 
EC European Commission 
EFSA European Food Safety Authority 
ELISA Enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay 
EP Swine enzootic pneumonia (mycoplasma hyopneumoniae infection) 
EU European Union 
FMD Foot-and-mouth disease 
IBR Infectious bovine rhinotracheitis 
IPV / IPB Infectious pustular vulvovaginits / infectious pustular balanophostitis 
OIE World Organisation for Animal Health (office international des epizooties) 
PCR Polymerase chain reaction 
PRRS Porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome 
PRV Pseudorabies virus / suid herpesvirus type 1 
R0 Basic reproductive ratio 
SFVO Swiss Federal Veterinary Office 
SPS agreement Sanitary and phytosanitary measures agreement 
SUISAG Swiss pig breeders organisation 
TCID50 50% tissue culture infective dose 
TRACES Trade control and expert system 
TVD Swiss national animal movements database (Tierverkehrsdatenbank) 
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Definition of terms 
 
Commodity ** Animals, products of animal origin intended for human consumption, for 
animal feeding, for pharmaceutical or surgical use or for agricultural or 
industrial use, semen, embryos / ova, biological products and pathological 
material 
Domestic animal Animal of the domestic herd (i.e. any pig / cattle hold in Switzerland that is 
not imported) 
Domestic herd Swiss national herd (i.e. all pigs / cattle hold in Switzerland that is not 
imported) 
gB Glycoprotein B, an envelope protein of herpesviruses 
gB-ELISA Diagnostic kit to detect antibodies against gB in infected cattle (applied to 
non-vaccinated cattle) 
gE Glycoprotein E, an envelope protein of herpesviruses (suitable to create 
deletion mutants for marker vaccines) 
gE-ELISA Diagnostic kit to detect antibodies against gE in vaccinated and infected 
animals (applied to vaccinated animals) 
Hazard ** Any pathogenic agent that could produce adverse consequences on the 
importation or a commodity 
Import Within this thesis, ‘import’ refers to trade from any country into Switzerland 
Indirect ELISA Conventional diagnostic kit to detect antibodies against BoHV-1 antigens 
and PRV antigens, respectively (applied to non-vaccinated cattle) 
Input * Any information that is fed into a model (including parameters, variables, 
data, distributions) 
Marker vaccine Vaccine that allows for DIVA strategy 
Model * A simplified representation of the reality to simulate the biological 
processes under study 
Parameter * A numerical descriptive measure that characterises a population, mostly 
used to represent arguments of mathematical, statistical or probability 
distribution functions 
Probability Likelihood of occurrence of a defined situation 
Proportion Fraction of the population that fulfills defined conditions 
PRV-ELISA Conventional diagnostic kit to detect antibodies against PRV in infected 
pigs (applied to non-vaccinated pigs) 
  
 VIII
 
Risk ** Likelihood of the occurrence and the likely magnitude of the consequences 
of an adverse event to animal or human health in the importing country, i.e. 
Switzerland, during a specified time period 
Test performance Sensitivity and specificity of a diagnostic test 
Vaccinated Within this thesis, 'vaccinated' refers to an animal vaccinated with a marker 
vaccine 
Variable * Any characteristic that has different value for different subjects or objects 
 
*    from the OIE handbook (Anonymous, 2004c) 
**  from the OIE code (Anonymous, 2005e) 
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Summary 
SUMMARY IN ENGLISH 
Two risk assessments using stochastic modelling technique were conducted regarding 
the hypothetical import of marker-vaccinated animals from countries where an official 
eradication programme was in place. By using scenario trees and collecting information 
from literature and experts, models were developed for Aujeszky's disease (AD) and 
Infectious bovine rhinotracheitis (IBR), respectively. The aim of the project was to provide 
decision makers and risk management with recommendations for possible future import 
scenarios. 
The model for Aujeszky's disease in pigs, using parameters based on an assumed 
import from the example region Spain, showed for a single imported pig a probability of 
introduction and subsequent infection of a Swiss pig of 4.9 x 10-4 for a marker-vaccinated 
and 4.73 x 10-7 for a non-vaccinated pig. For IBR in cattle, using parameters based on an 
assumed import from Saxony-Anhalt, the model output was for a single imported cattle a 
probability of introduction and infection of a Swiss cattle of 2.40 x 10-3 for marker-
vaccinated and 1.78 x 10-4 for non-vaccinated cattle. Based on these results, import 
restrictions for vaccinated animals are justified. 
The results were strongly dependent from the level of virus presence in the exporting 
country. Test performance was only relevant in the IBR model since cattle were tested 
more than once. The probability of seronegative carriers and the probability of reactivation 
during separation had also an impact on the outcome. For IBR, additional information 
regarding test dependence and transmission probabilities from vaccinated to non-
vaccinated animals would allow for a more precise estimate. 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG IN DEUTSCH 
Zwei Risikoabschätzungen bezüglich des hypothetischen Imports von mit Markerimpf-
stoffen geimpften Tieren aus Ländern mit offiziellem Eradikationsprogramm wurden 
durchgeführt. Mittels Szenario-Bäumen und Literaturrecherchen sowie Expertenmeinun-
gen wurden zwei stochastische Modelle entwickelt betreffend Aujeszkyscher Krankheit 
(AD) und Infektiöser boviner Rhinotracheitis (IBR). Das Ziel des Projekts war es, dem 
Risikomanagement eine Entscheidungshilfe mit Empfehlungen zu zukünftigen Import-
szenarios zur Verfügung zu stellen. 
Das Modell für AD in aus Spanien importierten Schweinen zeigte für ein einzelnes 
importiertes Schwein eine Wahrscheinlichkeit, die Krankheit einzuschleppen und ein 
Schweizer Tier zu infizieren von 4.9 x 10-4 für mit Markerimpfstoffen geimpfte und 4.73 x 
10-7 für ungeimpfte. Bezüglich IBR in Rindern aus Sachsen-Anhalt waren die Resultate für 
ein einzelnes importiertes Rind 2.40 x 10-3 für geimpfte and 1.78 x 10-4 für ungeimpfte. 
Diese Resultate stützen die aktuellen Importbeschränkungen für geimpfte Tiere. 
Die Werte waren für beide Modelle stark abhängig von der mengenmässigen Präsenz 
des Erregers im Exportland. Die Leistungsfähigkeit des Tests war nur für das IBR-Model 
von Bedeutung, da die Rinder mehrfach getestet werden. Die Wahrscheinlichkeit des 
Vorkommens seronegativer Träger sowie der Reaktivierung während der Absonderung 
hatten ebenfalls einen Einfluss. Zusätzliche Informationen zur Abhängigkeit der beiden 
IBR Tests und zur Übertragungswahrscheinlichkeit zwischen geimpften und ungeimpften 
Tieren würden eine genauere Schätzung erlauben. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Switzerland is free from a number of infectious diseases in livestock that do still occur 
in many of the countries from which live animals might be imported. For example, 
Switzerland is recognized as free from Aujeszky's disease (AD) and infectious bovine 
rhinotracheitis (IBR) as documented in the annual report of Swiss Federal Veterinary 
Office (SFVO) (Reist et al., 2006). At the same time, these diseases do occur in at least 
parts of many European countries, e.g. Germany and France. Some of these countries 
pursue control programmes targeted at these diseases. 
In veterinary medicine, sanitary measures may consist of vaccinating against a certain 
disease as a method of prevention or eliminating the infection using slaughtering methods 
such as “stamping out” which is, for many diseases, recommended by the OIE. Major 
changes in future disease control are nevertheless foreseen, in particular since the 
devastating outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) in the UK in 2001. An important 
factor is the change in public perception of animal husbandry making slaughtering policies 
less and less popular. Unfortunately, many veterinary vaccines prevent clinical signs of 
disease but wild-type virus excretion and spreading of the disease after field infection can 
still occur (Pastoret, 1999). 
In recent years, molecular biology procedures have had a major impact on the 
preparation of veterinary vaccines, in particular in food animals (Babiuk, 2002; van 
Oirschot, 1999; van Oirschot et al., 1997). Marker vaccines are newly developed 
vaccines, which can be used in the scope of a disease elimination program since they 
allow differentiating between infected from vaccinated animals. “True” marker vaccines 
are obtained either by the deletion of a certain gene coding for a non-essential protein of 
the infectious virus (gene deletion vaccines) or by the expression of the major antigenic 
protein (subunit vaccines) such as the E2 vaccine against classical swine fever (CSF) 
(van Oirschot, 2001; Moormann et al., 2000).  
The crucial feature of marker vaccines is the differentiation of the antibody response. 
For an effective marker vaccine virus it is critical that the gene product used does not 
affect its immunogenicity, is expressed in field virus, and is itself a good immunogen. So 
far, only AD and IBR marker vaccines have been successfully used in the field (van 
Oirschot, 2001). A CSF marker vaccine has been registered recently in the EU for 
emergency use, and has been applied in the field in Mexico since 2001 (Depner, K., 
personal communication). Marker vaccines must always be used together with a 
companion diagnostic test allowing the distinction between animals infected with the wild-
type virus and vaccinated animals. These tests are usually based on the enzyme-linked 
immunoassay (ELISA) principle.  
Until today, Switzerland has not allowed the importation of live animals that are 
seropositive due to vaccination against a disease exotic to Switzerland even if a marker 
vaccine was used. However, according to WTO and SPS agreements, international trade 
may only be restricted if an unacceptable risk to the importing country can be 
demonstrated using risk assessment methods (Anonymous, 1998). Risk assessments are 
conducted in the context of international trade according to the guidelines of the OIE 
(Anonymous, 2004c) and have been successfully used in Switzerland to adapt import 
requirements (Breidenbach et al., 2004; Hauser et al., 2004).  
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The objective of the present thesis was to compare the probabilities of introduction of 
AD and IBR into Switzerland by the import of marker-vaccinated and non-vaccinated live 
animals, respectively. Therefore, trading regulations and current import practice for pigs 
and cattle imported from countries not free from the respective infection were examined. 
The probabilities of introduction were estimated using scenario tree and stochastic 
modelling techniques, taking into account all available information on biological pathways 
and test performances. The assessment was conducted to provide decision-makers and 
risk management with recommendations concerning the possible import of marker-
vaccinated animals into Switzerland. 
According to the OIE guidelines, risk assessment consists of hazard identification, 
development of a risk model, including release and exposure assessment as well as 
consequence assessment. The hazards in this project are the herpes viruses causing AD 
in pigs and IBR in cattle. A risk model was developed including a scenario tree and a 
stochastic spreadsheet model. The objective of the risk model was to identify all risk 
pathways that may lead to the undesired event, i.e., disease introduction into Switzerland, 
which, in this case, was defined as the infection of one single animal of the domestic herd. 
The model makes it possible to estimate event probabilities along various branches of the 
scenario tree and the simulation of various risk management scenarios. Within the scope 
of a doctoral thesis, models were developed for AD and IBR and estimates were made 
regarding the probability of introducing the disease by hypothetical import of vaccinated 
animals. Those estimates were compared to the probability of introduction by import of 
non-vaccinated animals as practised today, since a zero-risk situation can never be 
reached. The input values were derived from literature data and expert opinion and can be 
refined later on in the model if it seems appropriate on the basis of newer findings. 
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Chapter 2 Review of existing information 
2.1. HERPESVIRUSES 
2.1.1. General characteristics 
Herpesviruses are enveloped double-stranded DNA viruses with a diameter of around 
120 to 200 nanometers that infect a wide range of vertebrates and at least one 
invertebrate (the oyster) though many of them infect only a single species. Their most 
outstanding characteristic is the capability to establish lifelong latency in infected hosts 
(Flint et al., 2003).  
2.1.1.1. Classification 
The Herpesviridae family, comprising more than 120 viruses, is divided into the 
subfamilies alpha-herpesvirinae, beta-herpesvirinae and gamma-herpesvirinae based on 
their respective pathogenesis of infection and their genetic properties (Flint et al., 2003). 
Alpha-herpesvirinae are characterized by rapid replication, causing the lysis of the 
infected cells. The host range is variable but may be quite broad. Alpha-herpesviruses 
establish latency mainly in neurons of sensory ganglia but other sites of latency seem to 
be possible. Beta-herpesvirinae replicate slowly and may induce an enlargement of the 
infected cells (cytomegaly). They have a restricted host range. Latency is established in 
lymphoreticular cells and in other organs. Gamma-herpesvirinae are characterized by a 
narrow host range and a predominant specificity for lymphoblastoid cells, where they 
replicate and establish latency. In addition, they may be specifically adapted to either B- or 
T-lymphocytes (Engels and Ackermann, 1996).  
Table I provides an overview of the most important species and their hosts. 
 
Table I. Important members of the family Herpesviridae 
 Alpha-herpesvirinae Beta-herpesvirinae Gamma-herpesvirinae 
Human Herpes simplex virus type 1:  
fever blisters 
Herpes simplex virus type 2:  
genital herpes 
Varicella-zoster virus: 
zoster, chickenpox 
Human herpesvirus type 5: 
cytomegaly 
Human herpesvirus type 6: 
exanthema subitum 
Epstein-Barr virus:  
Burkitt's lymphoma 
Human herpesvirus type 8: 
Kaposi's sarcoma 
Cattle Bovine herpesvirus type 1: 
infectious bovine rhinotracheitis / 
infectious pustular vulvovaginitis 
Bovine herpesvirus type 2: 
bovine herpes mammilitis 
 Ovine herpesvirus type 2: 
malignant catarrhal fever 
Pigs Suid herpesvirus type 1: 
Aujeszky's disease 
Suid herpesvirus type 2:  
cytomegaly (rhinitis) 
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Horses Equine herpesvirus type 1:  
abortion 
Equine herpesvirus type 3:  
coital exanthema 
Equine herpesvirus type 4: 
rhinopneumonitis 
  
Dogs Canine herpesvirus: 
death in puppies < 3 weeks 
  
Cats Feline herpesvirus: 
rhinopneumonitis, feline upper 
respiratory disease complex 
  
Poultry Marek's disease virus type 1+2:
neurolymphomatosis 
  
 
Since the present thesis deals with AD and IBR, which are both caused by alpha-
herpesvirinae, it will refer only to this particular subfamily. 
2.1.1.2. Replication of alpha-herpesviruses 
After infection, virions bind to the cell membrane via envelope glycoproteins gB and gC 
and enter the host cell mediated by gD, gB, gH, and gI. The released nucleocapsids are 
transported into the nucleus of the host cell, where replication takes place in three phases. 
The immediate-early proteins (α-proteins), produced in phase α activate phase β with the 
production of early proteins (β-proteins). These proteins control DNA replication and the 
production of enzymes for DNA synthesis. In phase γ, late proteins (γ-proteins) appear 
which are primarily virion structural proteins and additional proteins needed for virus 
assembly and particle egress. After modification and processing of the virus compounds 
in the endoplasmatic reticulum and the Golgi apparatus, new enveloped virus particles are 
assembled and released by exocytosis (Flint et al., 2003). 
2.1.1.3. Pathogenesis of alpha-herpesviruses 
After primary infection, as in many viral diseases, a productive phase with large-scale 
virus replication leads to acute disease and fast spread of the infection. However, after the 
host organism has recovered from symptomatic disease, the virus is not eliminated. It 
remains present in a latent phase. 
Latency is characterised by the fact that no infectious virus can be isolated and no viral 
antigen can be demonstrated in the latently infected cells but viral DNA can be shown by 
in-situ hybridisation or PCR. Latent infection occurs primarily in neurons found in sensory 
and autonomic ganglia. Virions enter the host cell as described above but the normal 
transcription cascade is blocked by yet unknown mechanisms. In the latent state, 
transcription is severely restricted such that a single pre-mRNA is produced from the 
latency-associated transcript (LAT) gene. Whether the LATs are translated into proteins 
remains unclear, but no viral antigens are synthesised. LAT deletion mutants are able to 
establish latency, but in-vivo experiments indicated that the deletion mutants, in contrast 
to wild-type virus, showed retarded and less efficient reactivation from latency (Engels and 
Ackermann, 1996; Rock, 1993).  
The interactions between virus, host cell and immune system during latency and 
reactivation are extremely intricate and still unclear. The mechanism of reactivation of 
latent infection is not yet thoroughly understood, but the trigger is physical and mental 
stress (Thiry et al., 1987; Thiry et al., 1985). Furthermore, it is emphasised in the literature 
that not only the virus but also the host contributes significantly to the efficiency of 
reactivation (Engels and Ackermann, 1996). However, the stressful situation needed to 
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induce reactivation is simulated in experiments with dexamethasone treatment (Rock et 
al., 1992; Pastoret et al., 1980; Wellemans et al., 1976). 
2.1.1.4. Epidemiology of alpha-herpesviruses 
Infection occurs aerogenically, orally or by contact of mucous membranes and virus is 
excreted mainly via nasal discharge and saliva. Herpesviruses are not very stable in the 
environment and have low survivability outside of a host. During primary infection, they 
are disseminated within susceptible populations, spread widely due to an efficient 
replication mechanism producing high titres of infectious virus but at the same time trigger 
strong immune responses. In most cases, the population overcomes the disease but 
retains a long-term reservoir of latent virus carriers. This capability to establish persistent 
lifelong latency after primary infection that can reactivate and cause new outbreaks of 
disease is the key to the effectiveness of the viruses double-track strategy (Flint et al., 
2003; Engels and Ackermann, 1996) 
2.1.2. Aujeszky's disease 
2.1.2.1. Agent and disease 
The causative agent for AD, suid herpesvirus type 1 (PRV), belongs to the genus 
varicellovirus within the subfamily alpha-herpesvirinae. Survivability in the environment is 
comparatively high, even pH-values from 4.0 to 11.0 as reached during curing or decay 
inactivate the pathogen only slowly (Liess, 1997). The infectious dose for susceptible pigs 
is reported between 102 - 104 TCID50 (50% tissue culture infective dose), for young piglets 
only 101 TCID50 (Visser, 1997) while virus excretion is estimated at 106 - 109 TCID50 in 
newly infected pigs and around 103.7 TCID50 in latently infected pigs after reactivation 
(Wittmann et al., 1982).  
AD, also called Pseudorabies or mad itch, was first described by the Hungarian 
veterinary pathologist Aujeszky in 1902. It is caused by the suid herpesvirus type 1 known 
as Pseudorabies virus (PRV), an alpha-herpesvirus with a surprisingly wide host range. In 
its adapted hosts, the pigs, it induces an infection with lympho-haematogenic and 
neuronal spread and an affinity to central nervous system and respiratory cells. In many 
other mammals, with the exception of primates and equids, it causes lethal 
encephalomyelitis. After appearance of central nervous symptoms, fever and typical 
pruritus at the site of entrance, the animals die within 1-3 days (Liess, 1997). Cattle, 
goats, sheep, dogs and cats belong to these dead-end hosts and may indicate infection in 
a nearby pig shelter (Lake et al., 1990), although in very rare cases survival of dead-end 
host has been reported (Read and Sinclair, 1988). 
In pigs, contrary to its colloquial name, PRV infection causes no pruritus. In adult swine 
the infection is mostly unapparent but abortions and production deficit cause economic 
losses in farrow and feeder lots. Disease symptoms depend on the age of the pig. In 
farrowers, acute or peracute encephalomyelitis leads to anankastic movements, ataxia, 
convulsions and death within one or two days. Morbidity and lethality in runts up to four 
weeks of age is near 100%. In farrowers up to two months, lethality is around 40-60%. 
Feeders from three to five months of age develop fever and vomiting, later lack of 
coordination, tremor and anankastic movements. If no complications such as aspiration 
pneumonia occur, the disease subsides after 10-15 days but still causes a weight-gain 
loss and prolonged feeding periods. In adult sows, PRV infection during gravidity can lead 
to resorption, mumification or abortion, depending on the time of infection. Lethality in 
adults is as low as 2-5% (Liess, 1997). 
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2.1.2.2. Epidemiology 
Aerogenic virus transmission between farms is possible (Grant et al., 1994), but the 
most important way of introduction into a herd is the acquisition of latently infected 
animals. Transmission via contaminated objects like tools, car wheels, or clothing is 
possible (Weigel et al., 1992). In particular, the use of insufficiently disinfected transport 
vehicles, journeys to market places or exhibitions with presence of infected pigs and 
collective transports that visit several farms have been demonstrated as risk factors of 
disease introduction (Bech-Nielsen et al., 1995; Austin et al., 1993). Other risk factors are 
pig density in the region, distance to the next pig holding, purchase of gilts, large herd 
size, and type of holding (Tamba et al., 2002; Leontides et al.,1995; Leontides et al., 
1994a; Leontides et al., 1994b; Weigel et al., 1992). Rigorous hygienic measures at the 
husbandry site and replacement with homebred gilts are negatively associated with 
disease incidence (Boelaert et al., 1999). 
In endemic regions, piglets are protected by maternal antibodies and become 
susceptible at 6-8 weeks of age when they can survive the disease and subsequently 
serve as latently infected hosts for the virus. Where the disease is endemic, infection 
remains mostly unapparent, but takes its toll in the form of production losses due to 
abortions and stillbirths in breeding animals as well as reduced daily weight gain and 
secondary respiratory infections in feeder pigs. Furthermore, recurrent losses in other 
livestock or pet animals associated with pig shelters occur (Salwa, 2004). 
In non-endemic regions, the introduction of virus into an uninfected establishment can 
be devastating. Outbreaks in breeding farms can lead to nearly complete loss of a whole 
production cycle due to gravidity disorders, stillbirth and lethal disease in farrowers. In 
feeder farms, there are fewer deaths, but weight losses prolong feeding periods and 
generate additional costs. And obviously, treatment costs and disinfection of holdings 
increase the economic impact. 
As in many pig diseases, wild boars must be considered as a potential hazard 
especially in regions where outdoor raising allows contacts between domestic pigs and 
wild boars. In Germany, seroprevalence of AD in wild boars reaches 25% and higher in 
endemic areas (Muller et al., 1998b) and a survey during two regular hunting seasons in 
2004 -2005 in Switzerland showed prevalences ranging from 0 to 3.73% in 1060 sampled 
wild boars (Koeppel et al., 2006). On the other hand, recent research has shown 
differences between circulating virus strains. Viruses isolated from wild boars have shown 
only low virulence in domestic pigs and vice versa (Muller et al., 2000; Muller et al., 
1998a). Furthermore, measures are taken to prevent contacts between outdoor raising 
pigs and wild boars and during a survey in 2004 there was no evidence of AD found in 
outdoor pigs (Koeppel et al., 2006). This way of transmission route is therefore thought 
negligible although possible and not further considered in the present thesis. 
2.1.3. Infectious bovine rhinotracheitis 
2.1.3.1. Agent and disease 
The infectious agent, Bovine herpesvirus type 1 (BoHV-1), is a member of the 
subfamily of alpha-herpesvirinae, genus varicellovirus. It codes for at least 10 envelope 
glycoproteins (van Drunen Littel-van den Hurk et al., 2001) which are important targets for 
the host immune response (Anonymous, 2005b). Although lower than PRV, survivability in 
the environment is comparatively high. In a cold and humid environment, virions may 
remain infectious for about one month and resist pH-values from 6.0 to 9.0. After infection 
of non-vaccinated cattle, excretion of virus titres up to 107 TCID50 have been recorded and 
after reactivation of latent infection titres of 101.5 TCID50 are still reached which can be 
enough to infect another non-vaccinated herd mate (Hage et al., 1996). Thus, the minimal 
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infective dose has been estimated at 103.2 TCID50 in naive cattle (Straub, 1979) and 103 
TCID50 in maternally immune calves (Schynts et al., 2001). Virus excretion is usually 
limited to the first two weeks of infection (Konig et al., 2003; Straub, 2001). 
Different virus strains were isolated and three subtypes (1.1, 1.2a and 1.2b) have been 
identified (Smith et al., 1995; Engels et al., 1986). Nevertheless, all strains are 
serologically identical and can only be differentiated by means of restriction endonuclease 
profiles. 
BoHV-1 infection is widespread in cattle all over the world. It has first been described in 
1950 in the United States and later caused actual epidemics in the 1960s and 70s in 
European countries. The first outbreak in Switzerland was recorded in 1978/79 
(Ackermann et al., 1989). BoHV-1 causes a range of diseases in cattle, including classical 
IBR and abortion, which are of greatest economic impact, and IPV/IPB (Anonymous, 
2005b; Straub, 1990). The clinical signs range from sub-clinical infection to mild or severe 
disease, depending on virus strain, immunological status of the host, age of the animal, 
and environmental factors (Pritchard et al., 2003). Other possible symptoms are metritis, 
mastitis and dermatitis as well as lethal meningoencephalitis and enteritis in young calves. 
IBR, the respiratory form of BoHV-1 infection, manifests itself as an acute febrile 
disease accompanied by nasal discharge and conjunctivitis (van Drunen Littel-van den 
Hurk et al., 2001). As with other herpesvirus infections, mortality is much higher in young 
animals. It causes weight-losses and may lead to death, especially among young calves 
and newborn animals. Particularly in feedlots with cattle less than one year of age, it is 
associated with the bovine respiratory disease complex, also referred to as shipping fever, 
which is caused by several bovine viruses and secondary bacterial infections (van Drunen 
Littel-van den Hurk, 2006). Due to its ability to modify the upper respiratory tract tissues 
and to cause immunomodulation, BoHV-1 is considered to be one of the major initiators of 
the disease (Makoschey and Keil, 2000). In adults, infection with BoHV-1 causes high 
fever, conjunctivitis, nasal discharge, sudden reduction of milk production, but only 
sporadic deaths (van Drunen Littel-van den Hurk, 2006). Abortions and reduced fertility as 
a result of infection further aggravate the economic losses furthermore (Hage et al., 1996).  
In regions where IBR is endemic, sub-clinical infections without visible clinical signs are 
most common. Calves are protected by maternal antibodies and clinical signs would 
appear, if ever, only in younger cattle after farrowing. Nevertheless, losses due to 
abortions, fertility disorders, reduced milk production in dairy cows and reduced weight 
gain in calves still occur. 
2.1.3.2. Epidemiology 
Transmission of BoHV-1 usually occurs by direct contact of a susceptible animal with 
an infected virus-excreting animal. Aerosol spread does occur but is considered to be 
limited to a few meters in most cases (Mars et al., 2000). Additional transmission routes 
are via infected semen (Kupferschmied et al., 1986) and vertical transmission (Ludwig, 
1983). 
New introduction of BoHV-1 into a population leads to fast spread among susceptible 
hosts, and febrile respiratory tract diseases cause losses in all sectors of cattle production 
(Vonk Noordegraaf et al., 2000). Due to breeding synchronisation, it may also cause 
abortion storms, and it has been associated with central nervous disorders as well as with 
death in newborn calves. Despite the strong immune response, the virus establishes life-
long latency in infected hosts and may be reactivated at intervals to cause new outbreaks 
of disease (Engels and Ackermann, 1996). 
Where IBR is endemic, virus spread is mostly unapparent and asymptomatic but 
economic losses are inevitable. Sporadic outbreaks of abortions and production losses 
and the association with the bovine respiratory disease complex keep BoHV-1 infections 
on the list of economically significant diseases in endemic regions as well. Furthermore, 
there is evidence that field virus infection or vaccination with a live mutant vaccine in 
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calves with high levels of maternal antibody may produce a delay or even absence of 
active seroconversion (Lemaire et al., 2000a; Lemaire et al., 2000b). For surveillance and 
eradication programmes, such seronegative carriers might represent a problem. 
Up to now, Bovinae, including zebus and buffalos, seem to be the natural hosts of 
BoHV-1. But infection of sheep, goats, deer (Wyler et al., 1989) and Camelidae (Puntel et 
al., 1999) may occur and results in mild or unapparent clinical signs. Although, in theory, 
transmission from acutely infected sheep to cattle could occur upon contact, there is no 
evidence that any of the non-bovine hosts could act as a long-lasting reservoir (Mollema 
et al., 2005; Hage et al., 1997). 
Acquisition of latently infected animals is the main cause for the introduction of BoHV-1 
into a formerly negative herd (van Schaik et al., 2001). Herd size and type of holding are 
further risk factors for seropositivity and, following, cattle density in the region and 
distance to closest cattle holding (Magana-Urbina et al., 2005; Dispas et al., 2003). 
Aerogenic transmission has been reported, but only over short distances (Mars et al., 
2000), and contaminated tools, including vaccination syringes, may cause infections. As 
for AD, contaminated and insufficiently disinfected transport vehicles, other contaminated 
objects, and journeys to exhibitions with presence of infected animals represent risk 
factors for virus transmission (Boelaert et al., 2005; van Schaik et al., 2001).  
2.2. MARKER VACCINES AND DIVA STRATEGIES 
Many efforts have been made to combat herpesvirus infections in animals, and 
vaccination is a common tool in many species. For example, most owners have their cats 
vaccinated against feline rhinotracheitis (Cocker et al., 1984), and for horses, most 
breeding associations recommend to vaccinate breeding animals by most breeding 
associations. In livestock production, vaccination against AD in pigs and IBR in cattle is 
practiced in many countries worldwide. But it turned out that vaccinated animals, even 
with strong antibody response, are not protected against infection and latency 
(Schoenbaum et al., 1990; de Leeuw and van Oirschot, 1985). Clinical protection can be 
achieved and losses reduced but the virus is still present in the population. Under these 
conditions a major drawback is the unknown status of an animal after vaccination and 
vaccination has to be continued to prevent new outbreaks of disease.  
To overcome this problem, a method to distinguish between vaccinated and infected 
animals is very desirable, not only for herpesviruses but also for several other viral 
infections of importance in livestock production. Such a method can make vaccination a 
much more valuable tool in eradication programmes despite its deficiency in preventing 
infection. Thus, a combination of vaccination and removal of infected animals is possible, 
resulting in a more economical way of expanded eradication (Wittmann, 1991). It has 
been suggested that marker vaccines need not prevent infection in order to be effective in 
an eradication programme because reduced susceptibility and reduced transmission can 
have a major impact on disease prevalence (Henderson, 2005; van Oirschot, 1999). But 
in emergency situations such as outbreaks of FMD or CSF, marker vaccines could also be 
of great value. Emergency ring vaccination could be performed without complicating the 
epidemiological situation, and the spreading of field virus would still be under control. As 
additional benefit in view of the rising concern among the public, uninfected vaccinated 
animals would not be subject to culling after emergency vaccination. 
Different strategies concerning different infections and virus types have been 
developed to achieve this aim, but the basic approach is the same. All DIVA-strategies 
("differentiate infected from vaccinated animals") include a marker vaccine and a 
companion diagnostic test. The technique may be as basic as identifying naturally 
occurring strains with deletions that support differentiating infected from vaccinated 
animals, but more sophisticated technologies may also be employed. Regardless of the 
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specific method, the diagnostic kit must be able to detect wild-type virus specific immune 
responses (Henderson, 2005). 
Recombinant technologies allow the construction of live virus vectors, such as various 
pox and adenovirus strains, that express immunogenic proteins from, for example, rabies 
virus (Roscoe et al., 1998), FMD virus (Moraes et al., 2003), CSF virus (Hahn et al., 
2003), West Nile virus (Siger et al., 2004), and avian influenza virus (Swayne et al., 2000). 
For rabies in foxes, racoons, and coyotes, a positive marker strategy has been used to 
mark and detect vaccinated animals. This is because in wildlife, monitoring of exposure to 
vaccine virus is a highly desirable way of assessing the effectiveness of applied measures 
(Roscoe et al., 1998). By contrast, in livestock where the vaccination status of the animals 
is usually known, exposure to wild-type virus is of greatest interest. For this reason, 
negative marker strategies are applied, i.e. infected animals are "marked" and can 
therefore be detected with the corresponding diagnostic test while vaccinated animals 
result as "unmarked" negatives in the same test. For example, for CSF, a subunit vaccine 
containing core protein E2 is combined with an ERNS-blocking ELISA to detect antibodies 
against non-E2 proteins (Beer and Mettenleiter, 2004; Bouma et al., 2000) as shown in 
Figure 1. Gene deletions in viruses, whether spontaneous or engineered, can also be 
used for DIVA-strategies, provided the deletion-mutants can produce sufficient immunity 
to protect against disease while the deleted gene provokes a reliable additional immune 
response after infection. Such strategies have been investigated for PRV (Mettenleiter, 
2000; van Oirschot et al., 1996b), BoHV-1 (van Oirschot et al., 1996b), and CSF virus 
strains (Meyers et al., 1999).  
 
 
Figure 1.  Principles of a CSF subunit marker vaccine  
(With kind permission from Beer and Mettenleiter (2004)) 
The figure shows expected test results for different situations. Naïve animals are negative in any applied test and infected 
animals are positive in both tests. Marker- vaccinated pigs react positively in the anti-E2-ELISA as they possess antibodies 
against E2 after E2 subunit vaccination, while they remain negative in the anti-ERNS-ELISA. Only vaccinated animals 
latently infected with CSF show positive results in the anti-ERNS-ELISA. 
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2.2.1. DIVA strategies for herpesviruses 
For herpesviruses, deletion mutants for several glycoproteins have been developed 
and tested under experimental conditions (Pensaert et al., 1990). The difficulty was to 
trigger a sufficient immune response to prevent clinical symptoms and reduce virus 
transmission and, at the same time keeping the deleted glycoprotein sufficiently 
immunogenic to assure additional antibody production after wild-type infection. The 
envelope glycoprotein E (gE), proved to be the ideal candidate (Schwyzer and 
Ackermann, 1996; van Engelenburg et al., 1994). gE-deletion mutants are able to infect 
cells and replicate. They trigger a strong immune response but their virulence is minimal 
and there is minimal virus spread. In wild-type virus, gE is strongly conserved and there 
where no gE-deletion mutants found in the field. Furthermore, gE provokes an antibody 
response within reasonable time and the gE-antibodies can be detected in wild-type virus 
infected animals with ELISA techniques (Beer and Mettenleiter, 2004).  
2.2.2. AD marker vaccines 
The first licensed genetically engineered vaccine, an AD vaccine (Zuckermann, 2000), 
was introduced in 1988 with a companion gE-blocking ELISA kit to detect wild-type virus 
infection (Mellencamp et al., 1989; van Oirschot, 1988a). Several vaccines against AD 
were already in practice at that time (de Leeuw and van Oirschot, 1985; Vannier, 1985) to 
minimise economic losses, and the commercially used vaccine strains Bartha, Begonia, 
and Phylaxia turned out to be gE-deletion mutants anyway (van Oirschot et al., 1990a; 
van Oirschot et al., 1988c). This circumstance entailed rapid advances in DIVA strategies 
for AD because purity, potency, safety, and efficacy of those vaccines had already been 
investigated, and only the performance of the gE-blocking ELISA kits had to be evaluated 
(Eloit et al., 1989). It was found experimentally that gE-deletion mutants could still cause 
severe disease or death in three-day-old piglets. To further reduce virulence and decrease 
the likelihood of reversion to it, mutants with an additional deletion in the thymidine kinase 
gene were constructed as, for example, the genetically engineered strain 783 (van 
Oirschot et al., 1991; Moormann et al., 1990; van Oirschot et al., 1990b; Kit et al., 1987). 
PRV-marker vaccines and companion diagnostic kits have been successfully 
implemented in many eradication campaigns ever since (Stegeman, 1995; MacDiarmid, 
1990) and have been shown to be effective in reducing clinical symptoms after infection, 
wild-type virus replication after infection, and transmission of wild-type virus in 
experimental infections and in the field (van Oirschot et al., 1996b; Mettenleiter, 1995) 
2.2.3. IBR marker vaccines 
Conventional IBR vaccines have been, and still are, routinely used but in many EU 
member states, their use is prohibited in favour of marker vaccines. Figure 2 shows the 
principle of such a DIVA strategy. For IBR-marker vaccines like for AD vaccines, gE-
deletion mutants are used. One reason is that gE is not essential for replication of the 
virus in cell cultures. Additionally, no bovine serum is needed to grow them, which 
reduces the risk of contamination with other bovine viruses. In vivo, gE is an important 
virulence factor and, in contrast to AD vaccine strains, the deletion of gE is already 
sufficient to attenuate BoHV-1. So far, no gE-negative virus strains have been isolated 
from cattle and gE is immunogenic enough to provoke a clear antibody response. As 
additional advantage, marker vaccines, as opposed to conventional IBR vaccines, are 
much less likely to be transmitted to non-vaccinated contact animals. The deletion 
mutants are derived from conventionally attenuated BoHV-1 strains or from genetically 
engineered viruses (Beer and Mettenleiter, 2004; Makoschey and Lütticken, 2002).  
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Figure 2.  DIVA strategy for IBR    (With kind permission from Beer and Mettenleiter (2004)) 
Marker-vaccinated animals produce BoHV1-antibodies but no gE-antibodies, while non-vaccinated animals have no 
antibodies against BHV1 at all. In a conventional indirect ELISA and in the modern gB-ELISA, the vaccinated cow would 
therefore be positive while the non-vaccinated one would remain negative. In the gE-blocking ELISA both animals give a 
negative result. After infection with wild-type BoHV1, the non-vaccinated animal seroconverts to BoHV1 with a complete 
antibody spectrum while the vaccinated animal produces gE-antibodies in addition to its BoHV1-antibodies. Now both 
animals are positive in any applied test and the vaccinated cow can be identified as latently infected using the gE-blocking 
ELISA. 
2.3. ERADICATION PROGRAMMES FOR AD AND IBR 
Several devastating animal diseases could be effectively eradicated from livestock 
populations to protect the human population from important zoonoses or to avoid 
economic losses in animal production. Bovine tuberculosis, brucellosis, CSF, African 
swine fever, and FMD are only some examples of successful eradication campaigns in 
many European countries. In most cases, the strategy includes screening tests and 
stamping out of infected animals or herds followed by surveillance programmes to 
maintain disease-free status. For widespread infections, vaccination strategies are also 
common in the early stage of eradication. After successful eradication, rigorous legal 
regulations and stringent measures to deal with occasional outbreaks, for example after 
import of infected animals, as well as positive results in monitoring programmes prevent 
further spread if the disease should reappear. 
Eradication campaigns are expensive and require a functional veterinary service for 
monitoring and surveillance. Culling or vaccination in large populations requires personnel 
resources and education, and fair compensation of affected farmers is important. 
Otherwise, compliance will decrease and all official efforts would be wasted, as freedom 
from disease cannot be achieved.  
In the EU, eradication programmes may be approved by the Commission. For 
approved programmes, annual financial support from the Community is granted. Table II 
summarises the situation regarding AD and IBR in Europe in 2004, taking into account 
information from EU as well as from OIE. 
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Table II. Situation in the EU member states regarding AD and IBR in 2004 
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Austria Free ∅ - 1996 Free ∅ - 2004 19 cases 
Belgium + ? 02-05 2002 + x - no data 
Cyprus Free ∅ - 1967 + x - no data 
Czech Republic Free ∅ - 2004  1 outbreak (4) + ? - 2004 1 outbr. (295) 
Denmark Free ∅ - 1991 Free ∅ - 2003 
Estonia + x - never  ? - 2004 serol. evidence 
Finland Free ∅ - never Free ∅ - 1994 
France + (free ? 02-05 2004  2 outbreaks + ? - no data 
Germany Free x - 2000 + ? 04-05 2004 69 outbreaks 
Greece + x - 2001 + x - 2003 
Hungary + ? 04-05 2004 serol. evidence + ? - no data 
Ireland + ? 03-05 no data + x - no data 
Italy + ? only in Bolzano 
2004 
1 outbreak (17) 
+  
(free zone) ? - 2002 
Latvia + ? - 2004 2 outbreaks (197) + ? - 
2004 
1 outbreak (20) 
Lithuania + x 04 1988 + ? - 2004 serol. evidence 
Luxembourg Free ∅ - 1999 + ? - 2004 serol. evidence 
Malta + x 04 never + x - no data 
Netherlands + ? 02 2004 serol. evidence + ? - no data 
Poland + ? - 2004 21 outbreaks (571) + x - 
2004 
serol. evidence 
Portugal + ? 02-05 2004 563 cases (693 cases in wb)  + ? - 
2004 
210 cases 
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Slovakia + ? 04-05 2004 1outbreak (1952) + ? - 
2004 
6 outbr. (9963) 
Slovenia + x - 2004 serol. evidence + ? - no data 
Spain + ? 97-05 2004 2899 (47696) + ? - 
2004 
1234 (9209) 
Sweden Free ∅ - 1995 Free ∅ - 1995 
U.K. Free ∅ - 1989 + x - 2004: 1 case on Isle of Man 
(Northern Ireland) + ? - 2004 1 case + ? - 
2004 
13 outbreaks 
Switzerland* Free ∅ - 1993 Free ∅ - 2004 1 outbreak (2) 
 
1 Status according to 2004/EC/320 (AD) and 2004/EC/215 (IBR) 
2 Eradication programme approved by EU Commission for the listed years 
3 As reported to OIE and published in Handistatus II 
* Not an EU member state but included for completeness of information 
+ Country designated as not free, no additional guarantees in intra-community trade 
∅ Vaccination prohibited 
? Vaccination practiced 
 x Not known if vaccination is practiced (not mentioned in OIE Handistatus II) 
 - No approved eradication programme implemented 
case Diseased animal 
outbreak Infected establishment with diseased animals 
() Number in brackets represents number of cases reported 
wb Wild boars 
serol. Serological evidence for presence of virus in survey but no cases reported 
 
Switzerland is recognised as free from AD as well as IBR. This is prooven by an annual 
risk-based survey (Hadorn et. al., 2002b). In the last century, AD has been present in 
Switzerland (Ehrensperger et. al., 1984) and since 1987, serological investigations were 
conducted on irregular intervals (Ackermann and Engels, 2003). In 1993, the last positive 
reactor was identified (Handistatus II, OIE) and in the Agricultural Agreement of 21 June 
1999, Switzerland was recognised as free from AD by the EU. To maintain its status, an 
annual survey providing a 99% confidence that herd level prevalence is below 0.1% is 
required. Therefore, since 2001, surveys are conducted regularly (Hadorn et. al., 2002a) 
and no reactors were found up to now. Under the bilateral agreement with the EU, 
Switzerland can request additional guarantees concerning AD for imported live pigs. 
Concerning IBR, the last important outbreak in Switzerland was in 1978/79 whithin the 
spread of BoHV-1 over whole Europe in the 60s and 70s (Ackermann et. al., 1989; 
Ackermann et. al., 1990a). Due to rigouros sanitation measures (Ackermann et. al., 
1990b), Switzerland could eradicate IBR and became recognised as free by the EU in the 
Agricultural agreement of 21 June 1999. Nevertheless, sporadic cases still occur due to 
contact to infected animals abroad (border grazing areas, exhibitions etc.) or artificial 
insemination with infected semen (Kupferschmied et. al., 1986; Hofmann-Lehmann et. al., 
2004). To maintain the disease free status of Switzerland, all cases are thoroughly 
investigated and the establishment is put under movement ban until all positive reactors 
are culled. Additionally, an annual survey providing 99% confidence that herd level 
prevalence is below 0.1% is requested by the EU. Within these surveys, establishments 
that harbour imported animals are targeted (Reist et. al., 2006). As a consequence of its 
status, Switzerland can request additional guarantees concerning IBR for imported live 
cattle. 
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2.3.1. AD eradication programmes in Europe 
Due to the devastating effects in young pig populations and in dead-end hosts such as 
cattle, eradication of AD is a highly desirable goal and has been started in many European 
countries within the last 25 years. By now, nine EU member countries, as well as 
Switzerland and Norway, have achieved freedom from disease while eleven states are in 
the process of eradication (Figure 3). Although other efforts on the part of breeding 
associations or producer organisations may exist to fight the disease in the remaining 
countries, only official eradication programmes approved by the EC are considered in the 
present thesis. For these official programmes, all details on strategy and current disease 
situation are provided as reports to the EU, whereas reliable data on other programmes 
might not be readily available. Table III describes some of the approved programmes in 
EU member states. 
Many strategies are applied in the approved eradication programmes, depending on 
prevalences, economic impact and available resources. In Malta, where the disease has 
never been reported, a monitoring programme is implemented to demonstrate freedom 
from disease. Only one country, Lithuania, follows a strict detection and culling strategy, 
while in the other nine programmes, eradication is supported by marker vaccination to 
avoid mass culling and large economic losses. Still, detection and stamping out of 
seemingly healthy virus carriers is inevitable in the eradication of herpesviruses but 
difficult to communicate to stakeholders. In this situation, marker vaccination to diminish 
virus circulation and stepwise culling of reactors can be very helpful although vaccinated 
animals may still become infected.  
In the nine countries with vaccination strategies, vaccines other than marker vaccines 
are prohibited. Where vaccination is compulsory, breeding pigs must be vaccinated three 
times per year while for fatteners either one or two vaccinations are administered. 
Corresponding to the high vaccination frequency and the fast production cycles, screening 
tests are conducted up to three times per year with gE-ELISAs and negative herds are 
officially certified as free from disease. Normally, only a subset of animals in a herd is 
tested to prove the negative status of the herd at a certain confidence level and threshold. 
Positive results are retested with confirmatory tests to avoid needless culling. In some 
programmes, vaccination may be terminated in individual hers when they are free from 
disease. In this case, certification of disease-free herds includes two stages, free with and 
without vaccination. 
The problem in eradication strategies involving vaccination is when to terminate 
vaccination. For freedom from disease status in international trade, vaccination has to be 
prohibited. But terminating vaccination too early can render all efforts useless if virus 
circulation starts again. Some countries, although free from gE-positive reactors for years, 
are unwilling to stop compulsory vaccination as long as virus is still present in the 
neighbouring countries. Especially for these countries, export restrictions represent a 
major burden and might not be needed. 
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Table III. Details on some approved AD eradication programmes in Europe in 2004 
 Vaccine Scheme Test 
Belgium gE-negative only Breeding pigs: 2x before first service, from 
the age of 10-14 weeks on 
Purchased pigs: 2x within 4 weeks 
Gilts: 3x per year (mlv)/ 2x per year (inact.) 
Fatteners: min. 1x 
HerdCheck 
(gE-ELISA) 
Hungary gE-negative only  gE-ELISA 
Ireland gE-negative: 
Porcilis Begonia, Geskypur,  
Suvaxyn Aujeszky 
Weaners: twice 
Replacement and breeding pigs: 3x 
Purchased Pigs: Vaccination at entry 
gE-ELISA 
Portugal gE-negative only Fattening pigs: 1x (at 10-12 weeks) 
Breeding pigs: 3x per year 
ELISA 
Slovakia gE-negative: 
Porcilis Begonia only 
only emergency vaccination by official 
veterinarians, direct slaughter afterwards 
gE-ELISA 
Spain gE-negative only breeding pigs: 3x per year 
Feeders and breeders: mind. 2x, first vacc. 
at 10 to 12 weeks 
gE-ELISA 
gB-ELISA 
 Table III includes only programmes, where more specified information was available. For basic information see Table II. 
 
 
Figure 3.  Situation for Aujeszky's disease in Europe 2004 according to 2004/EC/320 
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2.3.2. IBR eradication programmes in Europe 
Europe has a long history of combating against BoHV-1 infection, yet, only a small 
number of countries have achieved IBR eradication as shown in Figure 4. Currently, these 
are Switzerland, Norway, Austria, Sweden, Denmark, Finland and the region of Bolzano in 
Italy. Due to low prevalence at the start of eradication in these countries, a direct test-and-
slaughter policy was successfully implemented. In many other countries, measures to 
eradicate BoHV-1 infection are taken on the part of breeding or trading associations and 
also at private farm level (Ackermann and Engels, 2006; Anonymous, 2005b). But so far, 
only one country, Germany, has submitted an official nationwide eradication programme 
to the EC and obtained additional guarantees in case of import of live cattle from countries 
not free from IBR. The programme permits marker vaccination but it’s not compulsory, 
and different strategies are applied in the different regions depending on available 
resources and seroprevalences. Where vaccination is practiced, breeding animals are 
vaccinated twice a year while fatteners may be vaccinated less frequently. The 
programme is based on annual testing of all animals to detect and cull seropositive 
animals. Certification of establishments as free from disease with or without vaccination is 
possible (Anonymous, 2004b).  
For IBR, another strategy, applied in France by ACERSA (Association pour la 
Certification de la Santé Animale) also merits consideration. In this strategy, vaccination of 
reactors is permitted. An establishment may be certified as uninfected without or with 
vaccination (appellation A and B) but vaccination is voluntary for all herds. It is only 
compulsory if positive reactors older than 24 months are detected but not culled. Those 
reactors must be vaccinated afterwards (Anonymous, 2005c). Voluntary vaccination leads 
to herds with variable serostatus and herds where only part of the animals are vaccinated, 
which represents a situation never investigated under experimental conditions. However, 
this strategy has so far not been supported by the EU (Anonymous, 2005c). 
 
Figure 4.  Situation for IBR in Europe 2004 according to 2004/EC/215 
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2.4. INTERNATIONAL TRADE STANDARDS REGARDING AD AND IBR 
International trading of animals and commodities of animal origin is subject to the 
general WTO guidelines for international trade and, additionally, to the SPS agreement. It 
is stated that import restrictions may only be imposed if it is demonstrated by the means of 
risk assessment that the risk for the importing country is greater than in domestic trade. In 
animals, the possible risks are manifold due to the great number of diseases and 
zoonoses, and import restrictions may be imposed under international guidelines without 
conducting a complete risk analysis. OIE recommendations and European law may be 
considered as guidelines for animal and commodity trade.  
2.4.1. OIE Standards 
The health standards published by the OIE provide guidelines for trade concerning 
specific animal diseases. For terrestrial animals, they are contained in the Terrestrial 
Animal Health Code, Part II, which covers the ‘priority’ diseases for international trade 
(OIE list). The aim is to assure the sanitary safety of international trade by detailing health 
measures to be implemented by the veterinary authorities of importing and exporting 
countries in order to avoid the transfer of agents pathogenic for animals or humans while 
avoiding unjustified sanitary barriers. The measures have been formally adopted by the 
OIE International Commitee, the general assembly of all delegates of OIE member 
countries, and represent the result of the ongoing work by internationally renowned 
specialists since 1960. Additionally, OIE provides a manual of diagnostic tests and 
vaccines for terrestrial animals. 
2.4.1.1. Terrestrial Animal Health Code: Aujeszky’s disease 
In Chapter 2.2.2. of the Terrestrial Animal Health Code definitions and 
recommendations for AD are given which can be summarised as follows. To export 
animals from a country or region with a certain status, an international veterinary 
certificate is required to certify that the pigs fulfil the required conditions. It is always 
permitted to transfer pigs from an establishment, zone or country with higher status to a 
destination establishment, zone or country with lower status. On the other hand, for 
shipment from an infected country to a country with higher status it is recommended to 
impose a quarantine of 30 days including serological testing and a certificate confirming 
that the pigs were free from clinical signs of AD, are non-vaccinated, and had been kept in 
an AD free establishment since birth. For the trade of semen and embryos/ova there exist 
analogous requirements not specified in this abstract. This chapter of the code is currently 
under revision. 
2.4.1.2. Terrestrial Animal Health Code: Infectious bovine rhinotracheitis 
Definitions and recommendations for IBR / IPV are provided in Chapter 2.3.5.1. of the 
Terrestrial Animal Health Code and can be summarised as follows. To export animals 
from a country or region with a certain status, an international veterinary certificate is 
required to certify that the cattle fulfil the required conditions. It is always permitted to 
transfer cattle from an establishment, zone or country with higher status to a destination 
establishment, zone or country with lower status. It is recommended to demand a 
quarantine of 30 days and serological tests on two occasions with an interval of at least 21 
days for the transfer of cattle from an infected country to a country with higher health 
status. Cattle moved from an establishment not free from IBR to another establishment 
not officially certified as free should be vaccinated according to OIE. For the trade of 
semen and embryos/ova there exist analogous requirements not specified in this abstract. 
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2.4.2. EU standards and Commission decisions 
While the OIE code makes only recommendations to its member countries, EU 
Commission decisions are binding for all EU member states, and Switzerland is also 
subject to the veterinary trade standards under the Bilateral Agreements. For European 
trade of livestock, "Council Directive 64/432/EEC of 26 June 1964 on animal health 
problems affecting intra-community trade in bovine animals and swine" and its additional 
specifications apply. The Council Directive has frequently been amended since 1964, but 
the document constitutes the basis of all Commission decisions on trade in bovine and 
swine. The most important update occurred in 1997 with Council Directive 97/12/EC when 
all additions and amendments for 64/432/EEC were laid down in a new Directive. 
The original directive was primarily concerned with zoonoses that threaten human 
health and for these, compulsory Europe-wide eradication campaigns were implemented. 
Over the years, more and more diseases of economic impact have been added on a 
voluntary basis. Annex E, Part I, lists the notifiable diseases that must be monitored in all 
member states. The respective disease situations, e.g. for bovine tuberculosis and CSF, 
must be reported annually to the Commission annually (Art.8). For diseases in Annex E, 
Part II, including AD and IBR, eradication programmes may be approved (Art.9) by the 
Commission and additional guarantees requested by zones or countries free from disease 
(Art.10) but all measures are voluntary. Nonetheless, the additional guarantees demanded 
for international trade may not be stricter than those applied to animal movements within 
the country itself. 
2.4.2.1. Trade regulations for Aujeszky’s disease 
Already in 1982 the Commission submitted a proposal to the Council to establish 
trading regulations for AD but no agreement was reached. When 10 years later the 
situation had become urgent due to the liberalisation of trade in pigs after cessation of 
vaccination against CSF, an agreement on measures was reached and specific rules 
were established by Commission Decision 93/24/EEC for pigs entering areas recognised 
as free from AD. This decision was followed by others concerning approved eradication 
programmes. Decision 93/244/ECC sets out additional guarantees for pigs entering parts 
of the Community where an approved eradication programme is in operation and was 
amended to include other parts where eradication programmes have since been 
approved.  
These decisions have effectively divided the Community into three regions: free areas, 
areas where approved eradication campaigns are in operation and the remainder where 
the disease is either not under official control or where eradication programmes are not 
sufficiently advanced to be approved. On the basis of the Bilateral Agreements, 
Switzerland is recognised as free from AD and additional guarantees concerning the 
import of live pigs may be requested from exporting countries. 
The conditions for trade were subdivided according to the purpose of the traded pigs: 
animals for breeding, animals for production and animals for immediate slaughter. In the 
context of the present thesis, only the conditions regarding breeding pigs will be 
examined, because only pigs destined to spend the rest of their lifetime in Switzerland 
pose a possible threat to national population if they are latently infected. In any case, the 
transfer of pigs to areas of equal health status is possible without restrictions. 
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Transfer to free areas 
• The disease must be notifiable in the country of origin 
• No evidence of the disease in the herd of origin during the past 12 months 
• The pig must have been held in that establishment since birth 
OR at least during the last 3 months and in others of equivalent status since birth 
• Not vaccinated and only gE-deleted vaccines used in the herd of origin within the 
past 12 months 
• Isolated for at least 30 days and tested after 21 days, where all pigs in isolation 
must be negative in the test  
Transfer to areas where an approved eradication programme is in operation 
• The disease must be notifiable in the country of origin 
• No evidence of the disease in the herd of origin in the past 12 months 
• The pig must have been held in that establishment since birth 
OR at least during the last 3 months and in others of equivalent status since birth 
• The pig may be vaccinated with a gE-negative vaccine, but only gE-deleted 
vaccines were used in the herd of origin within the past 12 months 
• Isolated for at least 30 days and tested after 21 days, where all pigs in isolation 
must be negative in the test 
Criteria for approval of free status for country or zone 
• The disease must be notifiable 
• Epidemiological evidence for absence of virus 
• Serological surveillance implemented 
• No evidence and all serological tests negative for at least 12 months 
• Control and recording of animal movement must have been adequate to ensure 
that recontamination of clear areas has not occurred 
• Clear plans for monitoring of the disease in future 
Criteria for approval of an eradication programme against AD 
• The disease must be notifiable 
• Participation in the programme must be compulsory 
• Serological test scheme involves all herds (sampling at holding or at 
slaughterhouse) 
• Where positive results are found, the herd must be restricted and not released until 
a negative test has been obtained at least 21 days after removal of the last 
positive animal 
• Control and recording of animal movement must be sufficient to allow effective 
epidemiological investigations 
• Vaccine in use must be gE-deleted 
• Diagnostic tests must meet European standards 
2.4.2.2. Trade regulations for IBR 
Under Decision 93/42/EEC countries have for the first time been approved as free from 
IBR, and in 1995 official eradication programmes for IBR in Austria and Sweden were 
approved by the EC. By Commission Decision of 29 March 1995 concerning additional 
guarantees relating to IBR for cattle destined for certain parts of the territory of the 
Community, trade regulations for IBR were established in the EU. In Decision 
2004/215/EC additional guarantees apply to countries in Annex I under 64/432/ECC Art.9 
(approved eradication programme) and in Annex II under 64/432/ECC Art.10 (free from 
disease). So far, Germany is listed in Annex I of Decision 2004/558/EC and Denmark, 
Austria, Sweden, Finland, as well as the region Bolzano in Italy are mentioned in Annex II. 
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Switzerland and Norway were also recognised as free from IBR in the Bilateral 
Agreements (Decision 2004/78/EC). Additional measures were provided in Decision 
2004/558/EC to ensure that the objectives of Art.9 of Directive 64/432/EEC are being met, 
with limited implications for trade (Anonymous, 2005a). 
The conditions for recognising of freedom from disease and maintenance of the status 
strictly follow the OIE code. The conditions for trade were subdivided according to the 
purpose of the cattle traded: animals for breeding purposes, and animals for immediate 
slaughter. In the context of the present thesis, only the conditions regarding breeding 
animals will be examined. The movement of cattle to areas of equal health status is 
possible without further requirements. 
Transfer to free areas 
• No clinical or pathological signs of IBR for at least 12 months in herd of origin 
• Quarantine station for 30 days prior to shipment 
• All quarantined animals negative in serological test not earlier than 21 days after 
arrival at quarantine 
• Test for antibodies against entire BoHV-1 or against gB 
• Not vaccinated 
Transfer to areas where an approved eradication programme is in operation 
• No clinical or pathological signs of IBR for at least 12 months in herd of origin 
• Quarantine station for 30 days prior to shipment 
• All quarantined animals negative in serological test not earlier than 21 days after 
arrival at quarantine 
• Vaccinated animals: Test for gE-Antibodies 
• Non-vaccinated animals: Test for antibodies against entire BoHV-1 or against gB 
 
In December 2005, the Animal Health and Welfare Panel (AHAW) of the European 
food safety association (EFSA) published, on behalf of the European Commission (EC), a 
scientific opinion on the definition of a BoHV-1 free animal and herd and described the 
requirements needed to obtain recognition of herd freedom. Furthermore, the role of 
vaccination and the probability of release of the virus into free holdings, following the 
adoption of Commission Decision 2004/558/EC were discussed. Based on this report, 
conclusions were drawn and recommendations made as issued in the opinion 
(Anonymous, 2005a, Anonymous, 2005b). The following definitions were suggested by 
the EFSA, expecting the EU to adopt them in near future. 
BoHV-1 free animal 
• Showing no clinical signs of IBR 
• Subjected to a specific protocol* that assures sufficient probability (99.98%) that it 
is not infected  
OR  
originating from a BoHV-1 free herd in a BoHV-1 free zone where the surveillance 
programme assures sufficient probability (99.8% **) that herds are not infected 
It was stated that the free status of an animal may be ascertained more accurately if it has 
not been vaccinated because non-vaccinated cattle can be tested by the more sensitive 
gB-blocking ELISA (Anonymous, 2005a). 
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BoHV-1 free herd 
• All infected animals have been removed 
• Biosecurity measures are applied that prevent introduction of BoHV-1 by any 
means 
• Subjected to a specific protocol* assuring sufficient probability that infection is not 
present 
OR  
is located in a free zone, where the applied surveillance programme assures 
sufficient probability (99.8% **) that herds are not infected 
*  A protocol includes reference to repeat testing, vaccination, status of herd/zone, quarantine, etc and also the 
time period of “freedom” from BoHV-1 
**  Based on the calculations for a free zone / country 
2.4.3. Import regulations of Switzerland 
Under Bilateral Agreement I of 1 July 2002, Switzerland is subject to the trade 
regulations of the European Union (Decision 2004/78/EC). Before, other bilateral 
veterinary agreements such as the Agricultural Agreement of 21 June 1999 had already 
facilitated European trade with animals and their products. However, only the adoption of 
the Bilateral Agreement clearly established the equal status of Norway, Switzerland, and 
the EU member states regard to animal diseases. On 9 of December 2004, resolutions on 
the trade of agricultural goods based on Bilateral Agreement I were adopted by the Mixed 
Veterinary Committee of the EU and its neighbouring states within the scope of 
Commission Decision 2005/22/EC.  
Switzerland itself has adopted new import regulations for cattle effective 1 July 2004 
and for pigs effective 1 March 2005 regarding the import from EU member states and 
Norway. But due to the high animal health standard in Switzerland, many additional 
guarantees may be requested from the exporting country and SFVO publishes lists of 
countries from which no additional guarantees are required because they are officially free 
from the respective diseases, namely AD, IBR, bovine leukosis and Brucella melitensis. 
Technical guidelines for the Cantonal veterinary offices issued by SFVO recommend 
further measures to monitor imported animals after import. But the legal basis for 
implementing such measures is provided by Cantonal law and is in the legislative 
competence of the Cantons. 
It is worth mentioning that the regulations and agreements do not only deal with animal 
diseases and health standards but also with animal welfare issues like transport 
conditions and traceability of live animals by clear and equivalent identification practices. 
In the present thesis, only the conditions concerning animal health are considered. 
2.4.3.1. Import regulations for pigs 
For the importation of pigs, the additional guarantees granted by the exporting country 
under EU Directive Art.9 concern AD, transmissible gastroenteritis, and Brucella suis 
infection. Pursuant to Art.10, freedom from diseases notifiable to the EU listed in Annex E, 
Part I, of 64/432/EEC must be guaranteed in any case for European trade and includes 
CSF, African swine fever, rabies, brucellosis, FMD, Anthrax, and swine vesicular disease.  
Based on the Agricultural Agreement of 1999, Annex 11, and the Bilateral Agreements, 
the new import regulations for pigs were implemented on 1 March 2005. Figure 5 provides 
an overview of the import process for live pigs. 
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Import of live pigs from EU member states and Norway 
• Imports must be registered by the importer in advance with the Cantonal 
veterinarian of the respective Canton:  
- place of separation must be specified  
- Cantonal veterinarian decides on separation conditions and duration  
- arrival of the animals must be notified to the cantonal veterinarian within 24  
  hours by the importer 
• Required documents:  
- general import license from Federal Agricultural Office  
- health certificate consistent with 64/432/EEC or electronic certificate in TRACES  
   for each separation facility  
- certificate assures that conditions are fulfilled according to Agricultural 
Agreement of 
   1999, Annex 11, App. 2  
- certificate assures that animals were not vaccinated against EP/APP and PRRS  
   according to legislation on animal diseases 
• At the border, only documents are checked, physical examination only on     
suspicion of irregularities 
• Transport conditions consistent with animal protection legislation 
• Direct transport to separation facility  
• Cantonal veterinarian decides on separation instructions on the basis of technical 
guidelines 
Technical guidelines for separation for Cantonal veterinarians 
• Imported animals must be separated and subjected to EP / APP sanitation 
measures 
• Separation facility is assigned by the importer and accepted by the Cantonal 
veterinarian if it fulfils the condition of an EP separation facility according to Art. 
245f of legislation on animal diseases 
• No contact with other pigs, personnel is banned from other pig establishments 
• Animals and sentinel pigs have not been medicated within the last three weeks 
• Cantonal veterinarian designates responsible veterinarian for monitoring, duration 
of separation and examinations needed 
• Responsible veterinarian is responsible for clinical surveillance, blood sampling 
and compliance with separation instructions 
• If there is a case of notifiable disease, Cantonal veterinarian decides on culling of 
the animal or of all the animals 
• Examinations and measures in separation: 
- serological examination for APP and PRSS when all pigs are three months old 
- if all results are negative, ten sentinel pigs (between 10 weeks and 6 months of  
   age, serologically negative to APP) are exposed to the imported animals in  
   close contact 
- after four weeks, second blood sampling in imported and sentinel pigs for  
   serological examination for APP and PRSS 
- if vaccination is suspected in an animal, it must be slaughtered immediately 
- sentinel animals are subjected to direct slaughtering 
- when all pigs are nine months old, treatment against mycoplasma for fourteen  
   days 
• Suspension of separation by decision of the Cantonal veterinarian 
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Figure 5.  Overview of the processes for importing live pigs into Switzerland from countries not free from AD according to Swiss import regulations of 1 March 
2005 (described in Section 2.4.3.1; age of traded breeding pig assumed as reported by SUISAG (Swiss pig breeders association)) 
 
   26
The required quarantine and sanitary measures for import of pigs from third countries 
outside EU and Norway are very strict and make an import from those countries very 
unlikely. In the past five years, no pigs were imported from third countries. Therefore, 
import regulations for third countries are not further considered in this context. 
2.4.3.2. Import regulations for cattle 
For cattle, the additional guarantees granted by the exporting country under EU 
Directive Art.9 concern only IBR. Pursuant to Art.10, freedom from diseases notifiable to 
the EU listed in Annex E, Part I, of 64/432/EEC must be guaranteed in any case for 
European trade. These include rabies, brucella abortus, FMD, tuberculosis, infectious 
bovine pleuropneumonia, Anthrax, and enzootic bovine leukosis.  
Based on the Agricultural Agreement of 1999, Annex 11, and the Bilateral Agreements 
the new import regulations for cattle were implemented effective 1 July 2004. Figure 6 
provides an overview of the import process for live cattle. 
Import of live cattle from EU member states and Norway 
• Imports must be registered by the importer in advance with the Cantonal 
veterinarian of the respective Canton:  
- Cantonal veterinarian informed about separation abroad at least one week  
   before import 
- arrival of the animals must be notified to the Cantonal veterinarian within 24  
   hours by the importer 
• Required documents:  
- general import license from Federal Agricultural Office  
- health certificate consistent with 64/432/EEC (Certificate F) for each separation  
   facility or electronic certificate in TRACES 
- certificate assures that conditions are fulfilled according to Agricultural 
Agreement of 
   1999, Annex 11, App. 2, especially the additional conditions regarding IBR 
- certificate assures that animals were not vaccinated against IBR 
• Requirements in exporting country concerning IBR if country not officially free: 
- establishment: must have had no evidence of IBR for at least 12 months 
- animal: separated for 30 days and all separated animals examined serologically  
   after at least 21 days with negative result, no vaccination against IBR 
• Further requirements in exporting country: 
- establishment: must be officially free from tuberculosis, brucellosis and enzootic  
   bovine leukosis 
- animal: examined serologically for tuberculosis, brucellosis and enzootic  
   bovine leucosis within 30 days before shipment if country is not officially free 
• Animal born after 1 June 2001 
• Checking of documents and physical examination of all animals at the border 
• Transport conditions consistent with animal protection legislation and no import of 
animals later than 250 days in gestation 
• Direct transport to separation facility 
• Cantonal veterinarian decides on separation instructions on the basis of technical 
guidelines 
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Technical guidelines for separation for cantonal veterinarians 
• Imported animals must be separated 
• Separation facility is assigned by the importer and must prevent contact with 
domestic cattle (5m distance on pasture, double fenced, separated indoor areas) 
• Where no separation is possible, contact animals are under movement ban and 
would be included in any actions taken after incident (e.g. stamping out) 
• Cantonal veterinarian designated responsible veterinarian for monitoring, duration 
of separation and necessary examinations depending on current risk situation 
• Responsible veterinarian is responsible for clinical surveillance, blood sampling 
and compliance with separation instructions and visits the establishment at least 
once 
• Only staff and officials are allowed into the stable (emergencies exempted) and 
they are obliged to change clothes and disinfect shoes and hands before contact 
with other cattle 
• If there is a case of notifiable disease, Cantonal veterinarian decides on treatment 
or culling and all medical treatment requires official permission 
• Ear tags have to be exchanged under supervision of the responsible veterinarian 
within 21 days after import 
• Examinations and measures in separation: 
- all animals from IBR-free countries: separation suspended after exchange of  
   earmarks 
- at least one animal from non-IBR-free country: blood sampling after 21 days,  
  serological examination for IBR (and brucellosis if country not free) and  
  separation suspended by Cantonal veterinarian if all results negative 
• If separated group contained less than seven animals: 
- destination herd is put under movement ban for three weeks 
- three to ten weeks after suspension of movement ban, a control sample for IBR  
   from seven contact animals must be taken (but not from the imported animal) 
• If separated group contains seven or more animals: 
separation suspended, no further measures in destination herd 
 
The required quarantine and sanitary measures for import of cattle from countries 
outside EU and Norway are very strict and make an import from these countries very 
unlikely. In the last five years, no cattle were imported from third countries. Therefore, 
import regulations for third countries are not further considered in this context. 
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Figure 6.  Overview of the processes for importing live cattle into Switzerland from countries not free from IBR according to Swiss import regulation of 1 July 
2004 (Section 2.4.3.2). 
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2.5. RISK ANALYSIS FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
The principal aim of import risk analysis is to provide importing countries with an 
objective and defensible method of assessing the risk associated with the importation of 
animals, animal products, animal genetic material, feedstuffs, virological products and 
pathological material. It is a relatively new and evolving discipline, gaining more and more 
impact in international trade (Vose, 1997).  
In the context of import risk analysis the term 'risk analysis' refers to a process, which 
embraces a series of steps from hazard identification, through qualitative or quantitative 
assessments of risk, to the resultant management decisions. Risk assessment as part of 
the risk analysis process proved to be a valuable method to support decision-makers 
regarding complex situations (Hathaway, 1991). It is a powerful tool to help them to a 
better understanding of the faced risks, the effectiveness of risk management strategies 
and of the value of further research to reduce any uncertainty in the model (Vose, 1997). 
The term 'risk assessment' refers to the process of estimating the probability and 
impact of a particular hazard within the process of risk analysis. The OIE adopted the 
model and terminology first described by Covello and Merkhofer (1993) for risk 
assessment which is designed to assess the actual magnitude of the risk for specified 
consequences in a given situation. It can then be used to decide whether the risk is 
acceptable as it stands, or whether sanitary measures are required (Anonymous, 2004c). 
There are qualitative and quantitative approaches to risk assessment. In most cases, a 
qualitative assessment is conducted first. Only if a significant risk is demonstrated and the 
qualitative estimate is not sufficient for decision making, a quantitative assessment 
follows. The reliability of the quantitative assessment strongly depends on availability and 
sufficient quality of data. 
According to the document "Basic Principles for Risk Analyses conducted at the 
SFVO", the risk analysis process is structured only into the three elements risk 
management, risk assessment and risk communication while hazard identification is seen 
as a part of risk assessment (Breidenbach et al., 2004; Anonymous, 2002). Therefore the 
present thesis represents a complete risk assessment according to the principles of SFVO 
while risk management and risk communication lies in the responsibility of other 
departments at the SFVO.  
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Chapter 3 Material & Methods 
3.1. RISK ASSESSMENT 
All the steps undertaken in the present project were part of the risk assessment 
process. Detailed description of the different components are given below.  
Two separated risk assessments following the OIE code, Part I, section 1.3. on risk 
analysis (Anonymous, 2005e) were conducted regarding the import of marker-vaccinated 
pigs and cattle, respectively. Despite the multiple analogies between the two 
herpesviruses causing AD and IBR, there exist some important differences in trade and 
management of the two livestock species. Furthermore, the divergent import regulations 
and recommendations for international trade made it inevitable to conduct two separate 
assessments. Therefore, the definitions for the risk assessment processes such as 
detailed risk profile and assumptions are provided in the model descriptions for AD and 
IBR, respectively. 
As outlined in the principles for risk analysis by SFVO, current information was 
collected, documented and evaluated according to scientific criteria by means of literature 
research and expert elicitations. Existing knowledge gaps, limitations and uncertainties 
were transparently documented. As required for a quantitative risk assessment, the result 
is expressed as a numerical value on the basis of mathematical models (Breidenbach et 
al., 2004; Anonymous, 2002). This allowed for quantitative comparison of different risk 
pathways, implementing diverse sanitary measures. 
3.2. SCENARIO TREES 
As a first step, in order to provide a conceptual framework of the biological pathways 
associated with the hypothetical import of marker-vaccinated live cattle and pigs, scenario 
trees were developed for both diseases (Figures 7-10 and 12-15). The intention was to 
assist in conveying the range and types of pathways considered in a simple, transparent 
and meaningful fashion. The trees are a graphical depiction to identify pathways, 
information requirements, to ensure a logical chain of events in space and time, and to 
clarify ideas and understanding of the problem. Furthermore, they provided the framework 
for the development of the quantitative models. By convention, events were described in 
boxes, while the probability of an event was described by a line emanating from the 
respective box (Anonymous, 2004c). These scenario trees have a similar structure as 
decision trees, except that all nodes are probability nodes and have a value associated 
with them. 
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3.3. LITERATURE RESEARCH AND ELICITING EXPERT OPINION 
Input data for the different nodes identified in the scenario trees was found by 
searching literature. However, not for all nodes reliable values could be found. 
In complete absence of data, or if the existing data is scarce or might not be 
representative, an approach utilising expert opinion is recommended. To avoid problems 
with contrary estimates from different experts and to add a literature base to the 
estimates, we provided the expert group some days before the meetings with an estimate 
drawn from literature data, where data existed. We chose Pert distributions for most 
values, as the terms minimum, maximum, and most likely were easy to explain to experts 
not familiar with modelling and probability distributions. At the expert group meetings, the 
suggested input values were discussed in plenum until a consensus was found. The 
output reflected combined literature and expert opinion based values. 
The group consisted of three experts from the fields of virology, epidemiology and risk 
assessment. In a first meeting with the expert group in February 2005, the scenario tree 
for AD was discussed and refined. Throughout the whole process of risk assessment, the 
scenario tree was subjected to refinements and changes. The second scenario tree 
regarding IBR was discussed and refined at the 4th expert meeting in March 2006. 
After starting with literature research, the first suggestions for input values for AD were 
presented at the 2nd expert meeting in June 2005. Literature was found searching PubMed 
for different keywords, and finally, input values have been validated by the expert group at 
3rd expert meeting in December 2005. A first draft for the AD model was presented at the 
4th expert meeting in March 2006. Literature concerning IBR was also collected already 
from the start of the project, but input values were not defined before December 2005 and 
first presented at the 4th expert meeting. 
3.4. MODEL AND SOFTWARE 
Two stochastic models using Monte Carlo sampling for simulation in a Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheet were developed for both AD and IBR. The models were structured as 
suggested within the course “Evaluation of complex surveillance systems” (Martin and 
Cameron, 2006; Cameron and Martin, 2003). As an overview, Tables IV and XII show all 
nodes and their possible outcomes in one table. 
The spreadsheet was composed of two worksheets. One contained the scenario tree in 
a Microsoft Excel version and the other all input values, calculations, and outputs of the 
model. In the latter, values were ordered by type of node, starting with outputs, then all 
inputs for infection nodes, followed by detection nodes and category nodes. Further 
calculations and submodels are presented in additional worksheets. 
The stochastic models used for the risk assessment were developed using @RISK for 
Excel provided by Palisade Corporation, Ithaca, New York, USA. 
@RISK is a Microsoft Excel add-in that uses Monte Carlo simulation technique to show 
quantitative and graphical results for all possible outcomes of a model. Uncertain values 
are represented by @RISK functions to include a range of possible values and the result 
is presented as distributions of possible outcomes and the probabilities of them occurring. 
Both models were run with 106 iterations to provide stable results.  
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3.5. MODEL FOR AUJESZKY'S DISEASE 
3.5.1. Risk profile 
3.5.1.1. Aim of model and assessment 
The aim of the risk assessment was to estimate the probability of introduction of AD 
into Switzerland through import of a live domestic pig (Sus scrofa domesticus) vaccinated 
with an AD marker vaccine and transmission of the virus to a Swiss herd mate at any 
point in the life of the pig. Pigs for immediate slaughter were not within the scope of this 
assessment. There was no consequence assessment done because the infection of one 
single pig of the national herd is seen as an unacceptable outcome in all scenarios. 
The model was built to derive a quantitative estimate as outcome for the risk 
assessment regarding the problem defined above. The estimate of the probability of 
introduction into Swiss national herd through import of a vaccinated animal is compared 
with the probability through import of a non-vaccinated animal imported from countries not 
free from AD.  
3.5.1.2. Possible hazards 
Possible hazards were imported swine vaccinated with a marker vaccine against AD 
but latently infected. This applied to live pigs from countries not free from AD where 
marker vaccination was practiced. 
3.5.1.3. Endangered values 
Sufferers in case of an incident 
In general, Swiss economy (lost of export advantages), veterinary service (costs of a 
new eradication programme), game wardens and hunters (controlling, surveillance and 
eradication in corresponding wildlife population) would be affected. Particularly, for Swiss 
pig farmers, pet and livestock owners of other species also susceptible to AD like livestock 
(cattle, sheep etc.) or carnivore pets (dogs, cats), and the Swiss wild boar population, the 
effects would be serious. 
AD has no potential of zoonosis so there is no danger for human health. 
Gainers from no incident 
Swiss producers (augmented access to foreign breeding stock, continuing export 
advantages) and European producers (high quality standards in pigs exported from 
Switzerland) profit from Switzerland’s freedom from AD and would benefit from less 
restrictive import regulations (access to genetics, augmented trade). 
3.5.1.4. Assumptions 
Several assumptions were made to construct a model applicable to different countries. 
We decided that only herds with officially free status qualify for export of pigs to 
Switzerland. This applied to vaccinated and non-vaccinated herds. The possibility of 
exporting vaccinated animals was only considered in the context of an official eradication 
programme approved by the EU Commission. Despite some variations, requirements for 
the vaccination scheme were at least two vaccinations between 10 and 14 weeks of age 
and boostering three times a year in breeding animals all over Europe. 
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3.5.2. Scenario tree 
3.5.2.1. Release assessment Aujeszky’s disease 
As explained in section 3.2, a scenario tree was drawn for the process of importing a 
pig into Switzerland. The release assessment describes the steps from selecting a pig for 
import until the animal reaches the border and is shown in Figures 7 and 8. Therefore, it 
provides the probability that PRV would be carried into Switzerland by one single imported 
pig. 
Node 1: 
Animal vaccinated
Select a herd H in a country 
or region A where a control 
program is implemented
Node 2: 
Herd immunity
Level of immunity 
of herd H
animal within poorly 
protected herd (pp)
animal within highly 
protected herd (hp)
animal vaccinated (v)
no vaccination (nv)
Node 3:
Animal status
Select animal X in 
herd H for import
latently infected animal 
selected for import: 
go to Part II a
animal infected (ihp)
animal not infected (1-ihp)
No hazard
Node 3:
Animal status
Select animal X in 
herd H for import
latently infected animal 
selected for import: 
go to Part II a
animal infected (ipp)
animal not infected (1-ipp)
No hazard
Node 3:
Animal status
Select animal X in 
herd H for import
latently infected animal 
selected for import: 
go to Part II b
animal infected (inv)
animal not infected (1-inv)
No hazard
 
Figure 7.  Release assessment for AD, Part I: Selection of animal 
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Part II a: Test vaccinated animal
No hazard:
animal not imported
Infected animal not detected:
go to Exposure assessment
Node 5: 
Test abroad (gE-ELISA)
animal tested during quarantine
Node 4: 
Seroconversion 
against gE at time of 
testing abroad
not yet (1-sero_gE)
negative (Sp)
positive (1-Sp)
No hazard:
animal not imported
Infected animal not detected:
go to Exposure assessment
Node 5: 
Test abroad (gE-ELISA)
animal tested during quarantine
negative (1-Se)
positive (Se)
yes (sero_gE)
Part II b: Test non-vaccinated animal
No hazard:
animal not imported
Infected animal not detected:
go to Exposure assessment
Node 5: 
Test abroad (PRV-ELISA)
animal tested during quarantine
Node 4: 
Seroconversion 
against PRV at time of 
testing abroad
not yet (1-sero_all)
negative (SpNV)
positive (1-SpNV)
No hazard:
animal not imported
Infected animal not detected:
go to Exposure assessment
Node 5: 
Test abroad (PRV-ELISA)
animal tested during quarantine
negative (1-SeNV)
positive (SeNV)
yes (sero_all)
 
Figure 8.  Release assessment for AD, Part II: Quarantine and test abroad 
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3.5.2.2. Exposure assessment Aujeszky’s disease 
The exposure assessment describes the steps from arrival in Switzerland until introduction into domestic herd and subsequent 
infection of a domestic pig. Therefore, it provides the probability that a domestic pig would get infected if a latently infected animal was 
imported as shown in Figures 9 and 10. It was divided into two parts, separation in Switzerland and introduction into domestic herd. 
 
Pig X introduced into 
domestic herd D:
go to Part II
no clinical signs in 
pig X (1-SignV)
No hazard: Infection 
detected in separation
clinical signs in 
pig X (SignV)
Node 6:
Reactivation at import
latently infected but test 
negative pig imported
Pig X introduced into 
domestic herd D:
go to Part II
Node 7:
Clinical signs
Observable symptoms 
during separation in CH
no reactivation (1-rt)
reactivation (rt)
Not reactivated Pig X in 
separation in CH
 
Figure 9.  Exposure assessment for AD, Part I: Separation in Switzerland 
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No hazard:
No infection established
HAZARD
Swiss pig infected
domestic pig 
infected (trans)
no domestic pig 
infected (1-trans)
no reactivation in 
lifetime of pig X (1-r)
reactivation once in a 
lifetime (r)
No hazard:
No infection established
Node 8:
Reactivation lifetime
latently infected Pig X 
introduced into domestic herd D
Node 9:
Transmission
transmission of virus 
to herd mate
 
Figure 10.  Exposure assessment for AD, Part II: Introduction into domestic herd 
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3.5.3. Overview and used parameters 
In Table IV an overview over the modelled processes and a summary of the different 
steps within the model is given. The input parameters and abbreviations are defined in 
Table V. 
 
 
Table IV. Model overview for Aujeszky's disease 
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Table V. Definitions of parameters used in the AD model 
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3.5.4. Input values and calculations 
The described model represents the import of one single pig from the example region 
Spain. Spain was chosen because there, AD was endemic and an eradication programme 
approved by the EU Commission using marker-vaccination as a possible measure was in 
operation. Therefore, reports with data on the programme design as well as on disease 
occurrence were available. 
3.5.4.1. Node 1: Animal vaccinated (Input value) 
The proportion of animals that are vaccinated (v) was fixed at 1 to model import of 
vaccinated animals. For comparison, v could be fixed at 0 to model import of non-
vaccinated animals because nv = 1 - v. 
3.5.4.2. Node 2: Herd immunity (Input value) 
We estimated the proportion of herds that are likely to reach a high herd level immunity 
(hp) through vaccination and therefore would only have low inherd prevalence levels once 
the virus is introduced. By contrast, in poorly protected herds (pp) major outbreaks would 
occur resulting in high inherd prevalences, as immunity of the majority of pigs was not 
sufficient to prevent infection and spread. 
We defined a minor outbreak as an outbreak where inherd prevalences did not reach 
more than 40%. Assuming well-protected animals only cause minor outbreaks after 
infection, resulting inherd prevalence after infection in those herds is below 40%. Other 
outbreaks were thought to be major and lead to higher inherd prevalences. 
Parameters were derived from literature data. Leontides et al. (1995) found 34% of 79 
farrow-to-finish and 54% of 170 farrow-to-feeder units having prevalences below 20%, but 
they only sampled breeding pigs within those herds. Maes et al. (2000) reported 32% of 
115 herds having inherd prevalences below 20%.  
Therefore we used a PERT DISTRIBUTION with the following values for the probability 
of a vaccinated herd being highly protected (hp): 
 Minimum 11% 
 Most likely 32% 
 Maximum 54% (where pp = 1 - hp) 
3.5.4.3. Node 3: Animal status (Calculation) 
The probability of infection of the imported animal (ihp; ipp; inv) was derived from herd 
prevalence among negatively tested herds (HPrev; HPrev_nv) and the respective inherd 
prevalence for highly protected (Inherdprev_hp), poorly protected (Inherdprev_pp) and 
non-vaccinated herds (Inherdprev_nv) as follows. 
We multiplied the estimated prevalence of infected herds (HPrev; HPrev_nv) within 
negatively tested herds by the expected inherd prevalence. Based on differences in 
management, vaccination practice, type of holding, and regional pig density, we assumed 
two types of herds, highly and poorly protected, respectively. Depending on level of 
protection, virus spread and therefore expected inherd prevalences if virus is introduced 
were different. This reflects herds where minor or major outbreaks occur, once they are 
infected. The obtained values are shown in Table VI. 
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Table VI. Probability of infection of the animal: Values obtained by calculation  
Name Definition Formula 5th percentile median 95th percentile 
ihp 
Probability of infection for 
animal from highly protected 
herd 
HPrev * 
Inherdprev_hp 0.03% 0.24% 0.92% 
ipp Probability of infection for ani-mal from poorly protected herd 
HPrev * 
Inherdprev_pp 0.15% 1.22% 3.67% 
inv Probability of infection for ani-mal from non-vaccinated herd 
HPrev_nv * 
Inherdprev_nv 0.000006% 0.00004% 0.01% 
 
Inherd prevalences (Input value for node 3) 
We estimated the prevalence within an infected herd for highly protected herds where 
only minor outbreaks occur (Inherdprev_hp), poorly protected herds where major 
outbreaks are very likely (Inherdprev_pp), and non-vaccinated herds (Inherdprev_nv) 
respectively. 
Inherd prevalence for highly protected herd (Inherdprev_hp) 
 Minimum 0.1% 
 Most likely 20% 
 Maximum 40% 
Inherd prevalence for poorly protected herd (Inherdprev_pp) 
 Minimum 40% 
 Most likely 100% 
 Maximum 100% 
For non-vaccinated herds (Inherdprev_nv) the experts expected the same inherd 
prevalence once the herd was infected as for poorly protected herds. 
Herd level prevalence (Input value for node 3 from submodel 'Herd prevalence') 
Values for herd level prevalence among negatively tested herds were derived from 
Submodel Herd prevalence for vaccinated (HPrev) and non-vaccinated herds (HPrev_nv) 
as PERT DISTRIBUTIONS. See section 3.5.5.1 for further explanations. The values 
obtained from the submodel are listed in Table VII. 
Table VII. Probability of infection of herd: Values derived from Submodel HPrev for Spain 
Name Definition Formula 5th percentile median 95th percentile 
HPrev 
Prevalence within 
negatively tested 
vaccinated herds 
+ Inc 0.17% 1.36% 4.00% 
HPrev_nv 
Prevalence within 
negatively tested non-
vaccinated herds 
Inc = 0 0.000005% 0.00004% 0.01% 
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3.5.4.4. Node 4: Seroconversion at time of testing (Calculation) 
The probability of seroconversion in an infected animal at time of testing abroad for 
vaccinated (sero_gE) and non-vaccinated animals (sero_PRV) was calculated as follows. 
sero_gE = 1 - (conv_gE / age) 
sero_PRV = 1 - (conv_PRV / age) 
This formula was based on the assumption of a daily risk of infection for each day in 
the life of a pig that could be calculated as 1 divided by the age of the pig in days. This 
assumed that the risk of infection was constant for each day in the life of a pig, which is 
certainly untrue. But since the age of the pig at import lies within the narrow range from 6 
to 10 months, we thought the assumption was reasonable.  
Assuming a constant daily risk of infection allowed us to multiply the daily risk (= 1/age) 
by the estimated days until seroconversion to calculate the probability of testing an animal 
exactly within these critical days before seroconversion and therefore missing the infection 
given that age is always more than the estimated days until seroconversion. In our case, 
as the minimum for age of the pig at time of selection for import (age) was 180 days, it was 
given. The obtained values are shown in Table VIII.  
Table VIII. Probability of seroconversion: Values derived from calculation 
Name Definition Formula 5th  median 95th  
sero_gE 
Probability of vaccinated animal 
seroconverted at time of testing 
if infected 
1 -  
(conv_gE / age) 93% 95% 96% 
sero_all 
Probability of non-vaccinated 
animal seroconverted at time of 
testing if infected 
1 -  
(conv_PRV / age) 95% 96% 97% 
 
Age of the pig (Input value for node 4) 
The age of the pig at time of selection for import into Switzerland (age) was modelled as 
a Pert distribution based on the information from SUISAG about the common age of 
traded breeding pigs. Following SUISAG breeding pigs are traded mostly before first 
service at the age of 6 to 7 months and would enter separation in the exporting country 
around this age. Pregnant gilts at the age of 9 to 10 months are also traded. Only young 
pregnant sows, which gave birth shortly after quarantine have been imported so far 
(Zurkirch, R., SUISAG, personal communication). 
Input for age of pig (age) is the following PERT DISTRIBUTION:  
 Minimum 180 days 
 Most likely 285 days 
 Maximum 310 days 
Days until seroconversion (Input value for node 4) 
The number of days until detectable seroconversion after infection was estimated as a 
Pert distribution for vaccinated (conv_gE) and non-vaccinated animals (conv_PRV). In 
experiments most animals were tested positive for gE-antibodies 2 weeks after infection, 
latest reported after 4 weeks (Eloit et al., 1989; van Oirschot et al., 1988c). 
Seroconversion against gE in vaccinated animals took a couple of days more than 
seroconversion in non-vaccinated animals. There was no case of no seroconversion 
described in literature. First antibodies were found one week after infection (van Oirschot, 
1988a).  
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We used a PERT DISTRIBUTION for time until seroconversion after infection  
for a vaccinated pig (conv_gE) 
 Minimum 7 days 
 Most likely 14 days 
 Maximum 28 days 
for a non-vaccinated pig (conv_PRV) 
 Minimum 7 days 
 Most likely 10 days 
 Maximum 14 days 
3.5.4.5. Node 5: Test abroad (Input value) 
Sensitivity and specificity of the gE-ELISA (for node 5 from Bayes model) 
For sensitivity and specificity of the gE-ELISA, values were derived using a Bayes 
model. The Bayes model described in paragraph 3.5.5.2 included data from 6 papers and 
a total of 814 positive and 4384 negative sera, respectively. The values derived from the 
Bayes model are shown in Table IX. 
Table IX. Test performance of gE-ELISA: Values derived from Bayes model 
Name Definition Formula 5th percentile median 95th percentile 
Se Sensitivity of gE-ELISA Bayes model 98.2% 98.9% 99.4% 
Sp Specificity of gE-ELISA Bayes model 99.5% 99.7% 99.8%  
 
Sensitivity and specificity of the PRV-ELISA (Input value for node 5) 
The sensitivity (SeNV) and specificity (SpNV) of the ELISA for non-vaccinated animals 
was estimated as a Pert distribution based on the following literature. Durham et. al (1985) 
found a sensitivity of 0.96 (CI 0.94 - 0.98) and a specificity of 0.99 (CI 0.993 - 0.998) using 
304 positive and 3447 negative sera, respectively. White et al. (1996) reported a 
sensitivity of 100% (CI 0.94 - 1.00) using 55 positive sera. Boelaert et al. (1999) proposed 
a sensitivity of 0.95 and a specificity of 0.99, and the producer of the test kit reported a 
sensitivity and a specificity of 0.995. Since there was no more data available, we decided 
to draw an estimate as a Pert distribution instead of implementing data from only two 
papers into the Bayes model, though the latter had been possible. But by using a Pert 
distribution, we could relay on additional information like information from producer and 
the estimate of Boelaert that could not be inserted into the Bayes model.  
We used a PERT DISTRIBUTION for sensitivity and specificity of the PRV-ELISA (for 
non-vaccinated animals) with 
Sensitivity (SeNV) Minimum 94% 
 Most likely 98% 
 Maximum 100% 
Specificity (SpNV) Minimum 95% 
 Most likely 99% 
 Maximum 100% 
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3.5.4.6. Node 6: Reactivation at import (Input value) 
The probability of reactivation in a latently infected animal during import for vaccinated 
(rt) and non-vaccinated animals (rtNV) was modelled as a Pert distribution. 
Transportation and crowding mean stress and might provoke a reactivation in these 
animals.  
There were not many experiments documented on reactivation of PRV in latently 
infected vaccinated pigs and the used model (dexamethasone treatment) simulated a very 
high level of stress. Most data was from experiments with only once vaccinated pigs and 
therefore not really comparable to the situation in the field. Mean overall value suggested 
that around 65% of latently infected vaccinated pigs could be reactivated. Two studies 
where pigs were vaccinated twice led to virus reactivation in 25% of pigs (Ferrari et al., 
2000; Schang et al., 1994; Mengeling et al., 1992; Schoenbaum et al., 1990; van Oirschot 
and Gielkens, 1984). Therefore, we assumed a most likely value for reactivation of 25%. 
Depending on transport duration and group size, we assumed that even in best case a 
reactivation rate of 1% would occur. After discussion with the experts, we agreed on a 
maximum value of 60% since pigs were all vaccinated at least twice and stress level was 
not very high. 
Our conclusion after discussion with the experts was a PERT DISTRIBUTION for the 
probability of reactivation in vaccinated animals at import (rt) with 
 Minimum 1% 
 Most likely 25% 
 Maximum 60% 
Non-vaccinated latently infected animals are much more likely to reactivate infection at 
import (rtNV). We estimated a PERT DISTRIBUTION with the opinion of the experts for 
the probability of reactivation in non-vaccinated animal at import (rtNV) with 
 Minimum 50% 
 Most likely 75% 
 Maximum 100% 
3.5.4.7. Node 7: Clinical signs (Input value) 
The probability of detectable clinical signs in a vaccinated animal after reactivation 
(SignV) was estimated. After import, the pig would have to pass the Swiss EP/APP 
sanitary programme including a separation of at least eight weeks (Anonymous, 2005d). 
During this time the animals were surveyed for any signs of disease. But clinical signs 
would only be detected if they were visible. Other symptoms as, for example, slight 
increase in body temperature or reduced daily weight gain would not be detected.  
Vilnis et al. (1998) used the following clinical score for their experiment with 77 pigs: 0 
= normal, 1 = nasal discharge, 2 = depressed, 3 = off-feed, 4 = nervous signs, 5 = 
moribund/dead. The mean total clinical score for non-vaccinated controls was 14.3 (SD 
8.7) and the mean maximal clinical score on one day was 4.2 (SD 1.2). For IM vaccinated 
animals the mean total clinical score was 1.2 (SD 3) and the mean maximal clinical score 
on one day was 0.6 (SD 1). This data support the assumption that detectable clinical signs 
in a vaccinated pig are very unlikely because the vaccine was developed to prevent 
clinical signs and the losses due to them. But slight depression might occur in some cases 
and could be noticed. Other authors report clinical signs in vaccinated pigs after 
reactivation to be even more unlikely.  
We concluded that clinical signs are very unlikely in vaccinated animals. After 
reactivation from latency, symptoms are even more unlikely than after new infection. But 
symptoms are not impossible and due to virulence of field virus strain, biological diversity, 
general health status of the animal and prudence of personnel we assumed that detected 
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clinical signs occurred at maximum in 1 out of 100 latently infected vaccinated pigs after 
reactivation. 
We used a PERT DISTRIBUTION for the probability of observed clinical signs in a 
vaccinated pig after reactivation (SignV) with 
 Minimum 0% 
 Most likely 0% 
 Maximum 1% 
The probability of clinical signs in non-vaccinated animals after reactivation (SignNV) 
was fixed at 100% as pigs below ten months of age are most likely to show clinical signs. 
This was based on expert opinion and literature. For example, Van Rooji et al. (2004) 
found visible clinical signs in all four control animals and Vilnis et. al. (1998) reported a 
mean clinical score of 14.3 for six control pigs in the experiments described above. 
3.5.4.8. Node 8: Reactivation lifetime (Input value) 
The probability of reactivation in a latently infected animal at one point in the life of a 
breeding pig (r) was estimated at 100% following expert opinion. We assumed for the 
lifetime of a pig that there would always be at least once a stress factor strong enough to 
reactivate infection. Furthermore, in vaccinated animals, the vaccination would no longer 
be boostered and immunity would fade out. On the other hand, the animal might die due 
to any reason and therefore did not reactivate infection during lifetime, but there was no 
available data on the "reactivation rate" within the life of a pig. To get a biologically 
plausible input in absence of more precise data, we used a Uniform distribution with 
 Minimum 95% 
 Maximum 100% 
3.5.4.9. Node 9: Transmission of virus (Input value) 
The probability of virus transmission to a naïve herd mate once the infection was 
reactivated (trans) was estimated as a Pert distribution. Van Oirschot et al. (1988b) found 
that all 6 naive contact animals were infected which means a most likely value of 100%. 
The confidence interval of these findings was from 54% to 100%. In another experiment 
with once vaccinated, challenged and reactivated pigs, they found that all contact animals 
were infected too, but the sentinel pig of the twice vaccinated, challenged and reactivated 
group got not infected. This represented a transmission in 66% of cases with a confidence 
interval from 1% to 99% (van Oirschot, 1988b). With the experts, we agreed that the most 
likely value of transmission to susceptible naive animals was 100%. R0 for non-vaccinated 
animals was estimated at 10 (de Jong and Kimman, 1994) so if once one domestic pig 
was infected a major outbreak among our naïve population would be most likely. 
Probability of transmission of virus (trans) was modelled as a PERT DISTRIBUTION 
with 
 Minimum 54% 
 Most likely 100% 
 Maximum 100% 
For a non-vaccinated pig, transmission probability (transNV) was 100% referring to 
expert opinion and the reported R0 of 10 (de Jong and Kimman, 1994).  
   47
3.5.5. Submodels 
3.5.5.1. Submodel Herd prevalence (Submodel for node 3) 
To get a realistic assumption of the prevalence between officially negative herds we 
attempted to evaluate the country’s eradication programme. One of the difficulties for this 
evaluation was our lack of knowledge on herd size and farming structure in the exporting 
country. The only information we got was the regulations for the eradication campaign and 
surveillance requirements. For example, in Spain a sample size to detect inherd 
prevalences above 5% with a level of confidence of 95% was required and testing was 
performed every four months. The exact sample size per herd size was outlined within the 
regulations. To obtain the officially free status, a herd had to be tested negative at least 
three times. The level of confidence of the programme can be seen as the herd level 
sensitivity at the respective threshold, but is obviously not the sensitivity for proving 
complete freedom. Values to model Pert distributions were then drawn from the matrix in 
the Submodel Herd prevalence for vaccinated (HPrev) and non-vaccinated herds 
(HPrev_nv). 
The following input values were needed for Submodel Herd prevalence. 
Apparent herd prevalence and herd incidence (Input value) 
Apparent prevalence between herds (Prev) was modelled as a Beta distribution with 
the reported data from the country (Anonymous, 2004d). In Spain, this was 7736 infected 
herds within a total of 67’849 herds in the whole country in 2004. 
Prev is modelled as RiskBeta(7736+1;67849-7736+1). 
The apparent incidence rate (Inc) was modelled as a Gamma distribution. Data from 
Spain was 1567 new positives within 67’849 controlled herds in 2004. At the beginning of 
the year, 6169 herds were already infected; by the end of the year 7736 infected herds 
were recorded. The mean herd-years-at-risk were calculated as follows: 
= ((67849 herds - 6169 positive herds at beginning of the year)  
     + (67849 herds - 7736 positive herds at end of the year)) divided by 2 
Then, Inc was modelled as RiskGamma(1567;((67849-6169)+(67849-7736))/2) 
(Thrusfield, 2005; Anonymous, 2004d). The obtained values are shown in Table X. 
Table X. Submodel Herd prevalence: Apparent prevalence and incidence rate 
Name Definition Formula 5
th 
percentile median 
95th 
percentile 
Prev Apparent herd prevalence from data reported by Spanish authorities Beta distribution 9.76% 9.94% 10.12% 
Inc Apparent incidence rate from data reported by Spanish authorities 
Gamma 
distribution 2.47% 2.57% 2.68% 
Surveillance programme in the country (Input value) 
The expected herd level sensitivity (HSENS) and specificity (HSPEC) were derived from 
the regulations of the Spanish eradication programme. The level of confidence of such a 
programme can be seen as the herd level sensitivity at the named threshold. Since the 
same level of confidence was required for vaccinated and non-vaccinated herds, the 
same values applied for both. We assumed perfect specificity for both types of herds 
because positive test results would be retested with confirmatory tests to prove infection. 
  HSENS =   95% 
  HSPEC = 100% 
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True herd level prevalence (Calculation) 
True herd level prevalence (TP) was calculated from apparent herd prevalence (Prev) 
with the following formula (Thrusfield, 2005). 
TP = (Prev + HSPEC - 1) / (HSPEC + HSENS - 1) 
For HSENS the value derived from the surveillance programme's confidence level was 
used and HSPEC is fixed at 100% as explained before. This lead to the following 
simplification of the formula above: 
TP = Prev / HSENS 
We were using the fixed parameters for calculating TP as an overall estimation of 
HSENS, ignoring the parameter herd size. 
Incidence rate per 4 months (Calculation) 
The annual incidence rate (Inc) was divided by three to calculate incidence rate for a 
four-month period (Inc4) (Thrusfield, 2005) because herds were retested three times per 
year . 
Scenario tree for Submodel Herd prevalence 
The scenario tree developed to derive the prevalence of infected herds in herds qualified 
for export can be seen in Figure 11. Qualified refers to a herd officially certified as free 
from AD, i.e. in Spain negative in three tests within a one year period. We attempted a 
retrospective approach and chose to ignore all information prior to the first out of three 
qualifying tests as a risk adverse decision. 
The scenario tree lead to the following formulas: 
not qualified  
= TP * (1-HSENS)3 + (1-TP) * Inc4 * (1-HSENS)2 + (1-TP) * (1-Inc4) * Inc4 *  
    (1-HSENS) + (1-TP) * (1-Inc4) 2 * (Inc4/2) + (1-TP) * (1-Inc4) 2 * (1-(Inc4/2)) 
qualified but infected  
= TP * (1-HSENS)3 + (1-TP) * Inc4 * (1-HSENS)2 + (1-TP) * (1-Inc4) * Inc4 *  
    (1-HSENS) +  (1-TP) * (1-Inc4)2 * (Inc4/2) 
qualified and free   
= (1-TP) * (1-Inc4)2 * (1-(Inc4/2)) 
 
To get the prevalence of infected herds among negatively tested and therefore 
qualified herds, we had to divide the infected among qualified herds by all qualified herds. 
HPrev = (qualified but infected) / (qualified but infected + qualified and free) 
 = (TP * (1-HSENS)3 + (1-TP) * Inc4 * (1-HSENS)2 + (1-TP) * (1-Inc4) * Inc4  
                * (1-HSENS) +  (1-TP) * (1-Inc4)2 * (Inc4/2)) / (TP * (1-HSENS)3 + (1-TP) * Inc4  
                * (1-HSENS)2 + (1-TP) * (1-Inc4) * Inc4 * (1-HSENS) +  (1-TP) * (1-Inc4)2  
                * (Inc4/2) + (1-TP) * (1-Inc4)2 * (1-(Inc4/2)) 
 
Most likely herd level prevalence for vaccinated herds (Model output) 
The most likely value for HPrev (=HPrevMean) was calculated with the formula derived 
from Submodel Herd prevalence using the herd level sensitivity of the surveillance 
programme at its threshold. 
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Figure 11.  Submodel herd prevalence: Scenario tree for infected among negative tested herds 
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Minimal and maximal herd prevalence for vaccinated herds (Model output) 
To estimate the possible range of the herd level prevalence we calculated HPrev for 
different herd sizes. In the Spanish regulations the sample size for variable herd sizes was 
given. For any herd size minimal possible prevalence if herd was not free could be 
calculated assuming only one infected animal in the herd (= 1 / herd size). The minimal 
value for HSENS was calculated for herds with >1200 animals with sample size 59 and 
expected prevalence 0.05%. With this information, we calculated more precise estimates 
for HSENS regarding different herd sizes instead of just assuming HSENS as the 
confidence level of the surveillance programme as done for calculation of TP and 
HPrevMean. The intention was to get a more precise estimate for HPrev using the formula 
derived from the scenario tree with the calculated values for HSENS for the respective 
herd size as shown in Table XI in the column “plus Incidence”. For single test sensitivity 
and specificity, we used the values derived from the Bayes model (Section 3.5.5.2) for 
sensitivity and specificity of gE-ELISA (Mean values 0.9783 for Se and 0.9971 for Sp). 
We took into account that the reported incidence rate was only apparent, as we did not 
know how many of these herds had been truly newly infected and how many had just 
been false negatives in the last testing rounds. Therefore we repeated the calculations by 
assuming incidence equaled zero and all apparently newly infected herds had been false 
negatives in the former testing round. This is shown in Table XI in the last column “without 
Incidence”. 
The results of all calculations can be seen in the following table XI. We set the smallest 
value as the minimum and the greatest as the maximum value for the Pert distribution for 
HPrev (see fields with bold border). 
Table XI. Submodel Herd prevalence: Expected values for HPrev for different herd sizes 
 
Submodel Herd prevalence: Outcome for vaccinated herds (Calculation) 
Based on the calculations shown above, we estimated the prevalence within negatively 
tested vaccinated herds (HPrev) as a Pert distribution with minimum 0.0000002, most 
likely 0.005 and maximum 0.079. 
Most likely herd level prevalence in non-vaccinated herds (Model output) 
For non-vaccinated herds the situation was different from vaccinated herds. In case of 
an introduction of virus into the herd between two testing rounds, an outbreak with clinical 
symptoms was very likely and the herd would not enter the next sampling round anyway. 
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Therefore we assumed that the incidence rate in non-vaccinated herds represented 
former false negatives only and we calculated the most likely value for herd level 
prevalence among negatively tested non-vaccinated herds (HPrevMean_nv) with Inc = 0 
and herd level sensitivity of the surveillance programme at its threshold (HSENS = 
confidence level of surveillance programme). The formula for HPrevMean then simplified 
for non-vaccinated herds to 
HPrevMean_nv = (TP * (1-HSENS)3) / (1 - TP) 
Minimal and maximal herd prevalence non-vaccinated herds (Model output) 
From the result HPrevMean for vaccinated herds we obtained a most likely value of 
0.005 and for non-vaccinated herds and for HPrevMean_nv a value of 0.000015. The 
proportion of these two values was 0.0031 (= HPrevMean_nv divided by HPrevMean) and 
the minimal and maximal prevalence within negatively tested non-vaccinated herds were 
derived by multiplication of the values for HPrev in vaccinated herds with this factor. 
minimal HPrev_nv = 0.0031 * minimal HPrev 
maximal HPrev_nv = 0.0031 * maximal HPrev 
Submodel herd prevalence: Outcome for non-vaccinated herds (Calculation) 
The most likely HPrev_nv was calculated as described above for Spain as 0.000015. 
Proportional to the HPrev values we estimated HPrev_nv as minimal 0.0000000005 and 
maximal 0.0002. These values were modelled as a Pert distribution. 
3.5.5.2. Bayes model (Submodel for node 5) 
Sensitivity (Se) and specificity (Sp) of the gE-ELISA was derived from literature data. 
Since 1988 several papers were published concerning the performance of the marker 
diagnostics for Aujeszky’s disease. Following the principles of Bayes modelling, we 
decided to learn from the past in chronological order on the basis of a range chosen by 
the experts (Anonymous, 2004d).  
The prior distribution for the first Bayesian update was a uniform distribution from 0.8 to 
1 for sensitivity and specificity according to expert opinion. Confidence limits of the results 
of all experiments were within this range except for one experiment with lower specificity 
and it corresponded to the statements of the Veterinary Offices in France (Sens & Spec 
are 100%, Marechal, G., personal communication) and Germany (Sens & Spec are for 
sure above 0.98, Muller, T., Beer, M., Lemke, I., personal communication). This first prior 
was uninformed except from defining the range. A likelihood function was drawn from first 
experimental data and multiplied with the prior to get the first posterior. From there, after 
normalising the posterior, next prior and likelihood function was derived step by step 
through all experimental data. 
Six papers were used in the model in chronological order. Not all available papers were 
included in the model due to different reasons. Inclusion criteria were a reasonable 
number of animals used in the experiment (at least more than 20) and a known test kit 
utilised. Two papers were excluded because there were test kits used not longer on 
market or there were only few animals used for the experiment. We assumed that the 
principles of tests were the same (all gE-blocking ELISAs); the different test kits and the 
animals used were comparable to each other and with the field population. There were 
some papers included dealing with infected animals non-vaccinated prior to challenge or 
animals vaccinated with gE-positive vaccines. In our model, we separated the question if 
antibody response rises in an infected animal (probability of seroconversion at time of 
testing) from detection sensitivity of the test. Our estimate for sensitivity of test was only 
applied to animals that did have gE-antibodies and therefore we thought experiments 
dealing with detecting gE antibodies in infected animals were reliable no matter if the 
animal was vaccinated before infection or not. Obviously, there is a biological difference in 
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the two cases of infection. But since there was no case described in literature of a 
vaccinated pig that did not seroconvert against gE after field infection and time until 
seroconversion was already accounted for in the model, we decided to include 
experimental data from both types of infected animals. 
Included papers: 
• van Oirschot (1988b) 
experimental low dose infections, 24 sera, 22 expected positive (12 inoculated 
naïve pigs, 6 naïve contact animals, 4 vaccinated contact animals), 2 expected 
negative (vaccinated contact pigs that could not be reactivated with 
dexamethasone treatment) 
• van Oirschot et al. (1988c) 
4542 sera, 442 expected positive (440 SPF-pigs inoculated with field virus or gE-
positive vaccines, 2 vaccinated and challenged pigs), 4100 expected negative 
(4000 from certified free herds, 25 SPF-pigs, 25 bovine and 50 equine seras) 
• Schmitt et al. (1991) 
313 sera from feral pigs, 150 expected positive, 163 expected negative (compared 
to latex agglutination as gold standard) 
• Arias et al. (1992) 
176 sera, 74 positive (30 vaccinated and challenged, 44 challenged naïve pigs), 
102 negative (55 vaccinated not challenged, 47 naïve not challenged)  
• White et al. (1996) 
110 sera, all positive (pigs non-vaccinated that survived challenge infection) 
• Jacobs et al. (1999) 
33 seras, 16 positive (reactors from vaccinated formerly free herds, detected by 
routine testing, confirmed with confirmation ELISA and PCR), 7 negative (seven 
uninfected non-vaccinated controls) 
Excluded papers and reason for exclusion: 
• Motha and Eernisse (1992) 
only 34 sera examined with Moneliffa, Suvaxyn + ClinEase ELISA 
Moneliffa (Rhone Merieux) and Suvaxyn (Duphar) test kits are not mentioned 
anywhere else and no longer available 
• van Oirschot and Oei (1989) 
only 12 sera examined with experimental and Intervet ELISA 
Intervet test kit is no longer available (Intervet taken over by IDEXX) 
 
From the prior distribution and the experimental data from the first paper we derived a 
likelihood function for the results of that experiment. This function was multiplied by the 
likelihood of the prior function (which, in the case of an uninformed prior, equals one) to 
get the posterior distribution. The posterior distribution was normalised and then used as 
the prior likelihood for the next experimental results to be included in the model and so on.  
Finally, sensitivity and specificity was modelled as a generalised probability distribution 
based on the chosen range and the final normalised posterior distribution used as its 
underlaying density curve (Anonymous, 2004d). 
The resulting mean values for sensitivity (Se) and specificity (Sp) were 0.98897 and 
0.99726, respectively. The range of the values was 0.969 - 0.998 and 0.993 - 0.999. 
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3.6. MODEL FOR INFECTIOUS BOVINE RHINOTRACHEITIS 
3.6.1. Risk profile 
3.6.1.1. Aim of model and assessment 
The aim of the risk assessment was to estimate the probability of introduction of IBR 
into Switzerland through import of live cattle (Bos bovis) vaccinated with an IBR marker 
vaccine and transmission of virus to a Swiss herd mate at any point in the life of the cattle. 
Cattle imported for immediate slaughter was not within the scope of this assessment. 
There was no consequence assessment done because the infection of one single animal 
of the national herd was already seen as an unacceptable outcome. The infection of 
sentinel animals in the determined Swiss herd, which, in fact, are part of the national herd, 
was not seen as introduction of disease since these animals would be under surveillance 
and their establishment under movement ban at this stage of the import process. 
With the present model we aimed to derive a quantitative estimate regarding the 
question above. The estimate of the probability of introduction of IBR into the Swiss 
national herd through vaccinated animals was compared with the current probability 
through non-vaccinated animals imported from countries not free from IBR. 
3.6.1.2. Possible hazards 
Imported livestock vaccinated with a marker vaccine against IBR was identified as 
possible hazard. This applied to live cattle from countries not free from IBR where marker 
vaccination was practiced. 
3.6.1.3. Endangered values 
Sufferers in case of an incident 
In general, Swiss economy (loose of export advantages and additional guarantees for 
imported animals) and Federal veterinary service (costs of a new eradication program) 
would be affected. Particularly, for Swiss cattle farmers, the effects would be serious 
concerning the losses through disease and eradication. 
IBR has no potential of zoonosis; there is no danger for human health. 
Gainers from no incident 
Swiss producers (augmented access to foreign breeding stock, continuing export 
advantages) profit from Switzerland's freedom from IBR, whereas Swiss and European 
producers (augmented import to Switzerland) would benefit from less restrictive import 
regulations (access to genetics, augmented trade).  
3.6.1.4. Assumptions 
Several assumptions were made to construct a model applicable to different countries. 
Only herds with officially free status were seen as qualified for export of cattle to 
Switzerland. This applied for vaccinated and non-vaccinated herds. The possibility of 
exporting vaccinated animals was only seen in the context of an official eradication 
programme approved by the EU Commission. We assumed that the exporting country 
used the gB-ELISA for testing of non-vaccinated animals as recommended by EFSA 
(Anonymous, 2005b). 
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3.6.2. Scenario tree 
3.6.2.1. Release assessment 
As explained in section 3.2, a scenario tree was drawn for the process of importing one 
cattle into Switzerland. The release assessment describes the steps from selecting an 
animal for import until the animal reaches the boarder and is shown in Figures 12 and 13. 
It provides the probability that BoHV-1 would be carried into Switzerland by one single 
imported cattle. 
Node 1:
Animal vaccinated
Select a herd H in a 
country where a control 
program is implemented
Node 2:
Herd immunity
Level of immunity 
of herd H
animal within poorly 
protected herd (pp)
animal within highly 
protected herd (hp)
animal vaccinated (v)
no vaccination (nv)
Node 3 + 4:
Age + Animal status
Select animal X in 
herd H for import
latently infected animal 
selected for import: 
go to Part II a
animal infected (ihp)
animal not infected (1-ihp)
No hazard
Node 3 + 4:
Age + Animal status
Select animal X in 
herd H for import
latently infected animal 
selected for import: 
go to Part II a
animal infected (ipp)
animal not infected (1-ipp)
No hazard
Node 3 + 4:
Age + Animal status
Select animal X in 
herd H for import
latently infected animal 
selected for import: 
go to Part II b
animal infected (inv)
animal not infected (1-inv)
No hazard
 
Figure 12.  Release assessment for IBR, Part I: Selection of animal 
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Part II a: Test vaccinated animal
No hazard:
animal not imported
Infected animal not detected:
go to Exposure assessment
Node 7:
Test abroad
Node 6:
Seroconversion within 21 days
gE-antibodies appear in 
separation abroad
not yet (st)
negative (Sp)
positive (1-Sp)
No hazard:
animal not imported
Infected animal not detected:
go to Exposure assessment
negative 
(1-gE_ELISA)
positive (gE_ELISA)
yes (1-st)
Part II b: Test not vaccinated animal
Node 7:
Test abroad
Infected animal not detected:
go to Exposure assessment
Node 5:
Seroconversion
Seroconversion at 
any time point?
no (1-sero_gE)
yes (sero_gE)
No hazard:
animal not imported
Infected animal not detected:
go to Exposure assessment
Node 7:
Test abroad
Node 6:
Seroconversion within 21 days
Antibodies  against IBR appear in 
separation abroad
not yet (st nv)
negative (1-SpNV)
positive (SpNV)
No hazard:
animal not imported
Infected animal not detected:
go to Exposure assessment
negative 
(1-gB_ELISA)
positive (gB:ELISA)
yes (1-st nv)
Node 7:
Test abroad
Infected animal not detected:
go to Exposure assessment
Node 5:
Seroconversion
Seroconversion at 
any time point?
no (1-sero_gB)
yes (sero_gB)
* dotted grey pathways represent branches that are not relevant to the model since Sp equals 1 
Figure 13.  Release assessment for IBR, Part II: Quarantine and testing abroad 
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3.6.2.2. Exposure assessment 
The exposure assessment describes the steps from arrival in Switzerland until 
introduction into domestic herd and subsequent infection of a domestic cattle. Therefore, it 
provides the probability, that a domestic cattle would get infected if a latently infected 
animal was imported as shown in Figures 14 and 15. It was divided into two parts, 
separation in Switzerland and introduction into domestic herd. 
 
result negative, infection 
not detected
go to Part II (Node 13)
no reactivation (1-rt )
Node 8:
Separation group size
Node 10:
Test in CH
no hazard:
result positive
no hazard:
at least one  cow positive
all cows negative, infection 
not detected
go to Part II (Node 13)
reactivation (rt )
1-GSe
Node 9: 
Reactivation at import
due to stress
Node 10:
Test in CH
GSe
Se2
1-Se2
all cows negative, infection 
not detected
go to Part II (Node 11)
result negative, infection 
not detected
go to Part II (Node 11)
no reactivation (1-rt)
Node 10:
Test in CH
no hazard:
result positive
no hazard:
at least one  cow positive
reactivation (rt)
Node 9: 
Reactivation at import
due to stress
Node 10:
Test in CH
gE_ELISA
Se2
< 7 animals (lo7)
> 7 animals (ov7)
1-Se2
1-gE_ELISA
 
Figure 14.  Exposure assessment for IBR, Part I: Separation in CH 
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No hazard
HAZARD
domestic cow 
infected (trans)
no reactivation in 
lifetime of cow X (1-r)
no domestic cow 
infected (1-trans)
reactivation once in 
a lifetime (r)
No hazard
Node 13:
Reactivation lifetime
Cattle introduced into 
domestic herd, 
separation group >7
Node 14:
Transmission
HAZARD
domestic cow 
infected (trans)
no reactivation at 
introduction (1-rt2)
no domestic cow 
infected (1-trans)
No hazardNode 11:Reactivation Introduction
Cattle introduced into 
domestic herd, separation 
group <7
reactivation at 
introduction (rt2)
Node 12:
Test sentinels
7 herd mates tested
Node 12:
Test sentinels
7 herd mates tested
positive result, 
Infection detected: 
no hazard
No hazard
reactivation once 
in a lifetime (r)
Node 14:
Transmission
no reactivation in lifetime 
of cattle X (1-r)
SentSe
1-SentSe
HAZARD
domestic cow 
infected (trans)
no domestic cow 
infected (1-trans)
No hazard
positive result, 
Infection detected: 
no hazard
No hazard
reactivation once 
in a lifetime (r)
Node 14:
Transmission
no reactivation in lifetime 
of cattle X (1-r)
1-SentSp
SentSp
Node 13:
Reactivation lifetime
results from sentinel 
tests all negative
Node 13:
Reactivation lifetime
results from sentinel 
tests all negative
* dotted grey pathways represent branches that are not relevant to the model, since r equals 1 
Figure 15.  Exposure assessment for IBR, Part II; Introduction into domestic herd 
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3.6.3. Overview and used parameters 
In Table XII, an overview of the modelled processes and a summary of the different 
steps within the model is given. The input parameters and abbreviations are defined in 
Table XIII. 
 
Table XII. Model overview for IBR 
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Table XIII. Definitions for parameters used in the IBR model 
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3.6.4. Inputs and calculations for the IBR model 
The described model represents the import of one single cattle from the example 
region Saxony-Anhalt. Saxony-Anhalt was chosen because there, IBR is still present and 
an eradication programme approved by the EU Commission using marker-vaccination 
was in operation. Therefore, reports with data on disease occurrence were available. 
3.6.4.1. Node 1: Animal vaccinated (Input value) 
The proportion of animals that were vaccinated (v) was fixed at 1 to model import of 
vaccinated animals. The probability for an imported animal of not being vaccinated (nv) is 
nv = 1 - v. For comparison, v and nv can both be fixed at 1 to compare the results, i.e. run 
two models, one for vaccinated and one for non-vaccinated cattle. 
3.6.4.2. Node 2: Herd immunity (Input value) 
We estimated the proportion of herds that were likely to reach a high herd level 
immunity (hp) through vaccination and therefore would only have minor outbreaks if the 
virus was introduced. In contrast, in poorly protected herds (pp) major outbreaks would 
still occur, as immunity of the majority of cattle was not sufficient to prevent infection and 
spread. This would lead to high inherd prevalences (de Jong and Diekmann 1992). 
Bosch and co-workers (Bosch, de Jong et al. 1997; Bosch, Kaashoek et al. 1997) 
estimated in a field experiment R0 in not-vaccinated dairy herds at 5.6 and in cattle 
vaccinated with an inactivated vaccine at 2.7. Under experimental conditions, R0 for cattle 
vaccinated with a live vaccine was 0.9. Vonk Noordegraaf et. al (1998) suggested to 
assume R0 = 1.5 for live vaccines to prevent overestimation of vaccine efficacy when used 
in the field. On the other hand, Bosch et al. (1997) also found inactivated marker vaccines 
to be more efficient in reducing field BoHV-1 excretion after reactivation than live marker 
vaccines. Under particular assumptions, only the fraction (1-1/ R0) will lead to a major 
outbreak (Graat, de Jong et al. 2001; De Koeijer, Diekmann et al. 1998; de Jong and 
Diekmann 1992; Metz 1978).  
With the suggestions above for R0, this formula lead to 62% (=1-1/2.7) of herds 
vaccinated with inactivated vaccine and 33% (=1-1/1.5) of those vaccinated with live 
vaccine having major outbreaks and were therefore poorly protected. This assumption 
was supported by the experts. 
We used a UNIFORM DISTRIBUTION for the probability of a vaccinated herd being 
poorly protected (pp): 
 Minimum 33% 
 Maximum 62% 
(where hp = 1 - pp) 
3.6.4.3. Node 3: Age (Input value from data set) 
Age is a risk factor for infection. As animals remain life-long carriers of the virus, older 
cattle are more likely to be infected since they have been at risk for a longer time period.  
From the animal movement database TVD we obtained data of the age in months of 
3011 cattle imported into Switzerland from 2000 until 2005. This data is shown in Figure 
16. We grouped them into four age classes with different risks of infection following 
Boelaert et. al. (2005). 
Data from 2005 only was investigated, since new import regulations prohibit the import 
of cattle born before 1.6.2001 due to BSE prevention reasons. There were no older cattle 
imported in 2005. But comparing the data from 2000 until 2004, there seems to be an 
interest in importing cattle over 4 years of age and the model was aimed to represent a 
hypothetical future scenario where import of older cattle would be possible again. That 
was the reason for using data which did not represent the current import situation. 
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Definition of age classes and proportions of imported animals in each class: 
Q1     < 14 months 17% 
  Q2 15 - 29 months 62% 
  Q3 30 - 48 months 14% 
  Q4     > 49 months   8% 
Figure 16.  Age of 3011 cattle imported into Switzerland from 2000 - 2005 
 
3.6.4.4. Node 4: Animal status (Calculation) 
For each branch there was an effective probability of infection calculated to account for 
different risks of infection in age classes. 
Effective probabilities of infection (Calculation for node 4) 
To get the effective probability of infection (EPIhpQ1; EPIhpQ2; EPIhpQ3; EPIhpQ4; 
EPIppQ1; EPIppQ2, EPIppQ3; EPIppQ4; EPInvQ1; EPInvQ2; EPInvQ3; EPInvQ4) for an 
animal from a highly protected, poorly protected, or non-vaccinated herd within a certain 
age class we multiplied its probability of infection with the correspondent adjusted risk for 
the respective age class. The obtained values are listed in Table XIV. 
 EPI = P(infected) * adjusted risk of infection 
Table XIV. Probability of infection of the animal: Effective probability of infection 
Name Definition Formula 5th percentile median 95th percentile 
EPIhpQ1 Effective prevalence:  highly protected, age Q1 ihp * arQ1 0.1% 0.5% 1.0% 
EPIhpQ2 Effective prevalence: highly protected, age Q2 ihp * arQ2 0.2% 0.6% 1.2% 
EPIhpQ3 Effective prevalence: highly protected, age Q3 ihp * arQ3 0.2% 0.8% 1.6% 
EPIhpQ4 Effective prevalence: highly protected, age Q4 ihp * arQ4 0.3% 1.1% 2.1% 
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EPIppQ1 
 
Effective prevalence:  
poorly protected, age Q1 ipp * arQ1 1.2% 2.2% 3.6% 
EPIppQ2 
 
Effective prevalence: 
poorly protected, age Q2 ipp * arQ2 1.6% 2.8% 4.3% 
EPIppQ3 
 
Effective prevalence: 
poorly protected, age Q3 ipp * arQ3 2.1% 3.8% 6.1% 
EPIppQ4 
 
Effective prevalence: 
poorly protected, age Q4 ipp * arQ4 2.7% 4.9% 7.8% 
EPInvQ1 Effective prevalence:non-vaccinated, age Q1 inv * arQ1 1.2% 2.2% 3.7% 
EPInvQ2 Effective prevalence: non-vaccinated, age Q2 inv * arQ2 1.5% 2.8% 4.3% 
EPInvQ3 Effective prevalence:non-vaccinated, age Q3 inv * arQ3 2.1% 3.8% 6.2% 
EPInvQ4 Effective prevalence:non-vaccinated, age Q4 inv * arQ4 2.7% 4.9% 7.9% 
Probability of infection (Calculation for node 4) 
Probability of infection of the imported animal (ihp; ipp; inv) was derived from herd 
prevalence (HPrev) and the respective inherd prevalence for highly protected 
(Inherdprev_hp), poorly protected (Inherdprev_pp) and non-vaccinated herds 
(Inherdprev_nv) as follows. The obtained values are shown in Table XV. 
    P(animal infected) = HPrev * Inherdprev 
Table XV. Probability of infection of the animal: Values calculated for herd type 
Name Definition Formula 5th percentile median 95th percentile 
ihp Animal status / prevalence: from highly protected herd 
HPrev * 
Inherdprev_hp 0.19% 0.65% 1.24% 
ipp 
 
Animal status / prevalence: 
from poorly protected herd 
HPrev * 
Inherdprev_pp 1.70% 2.99% 4.65% 
inv Animal status / prevalence: non-vaccinated herd 
 
HPrev * 
Inherdprev_nv
1.69% 3.00% 4.63% 
Inherd prevalences (Input value for node 4) 
We estimated the prevalence within an infected herd for  
- highly protected herds where only minor outbreaks occur (Inherdprev_hp) 
- poorly protected herds where major outbreaks are very likely (Inherdprev_pp) 
- non-vaccinated herds (Inherdprev_nv) 
Transmission probability and mean duration of infectivity in vaccinated animals varies 
strongly with the level of herd protection (de Jong, 1995; de Jong and Diekmann, 1992). 
Therefore, we suggested dealing with inherd prevalence as dependent from immunity on 
herd level. This assumption was supported by literature data, showing that within infected 
herds the inherd prevalence was either very low or rather high. Defining two types of 
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herds helped to overcome the problem of representing inherd prevalence as a distribution 
with two peaks by using two one-peak distributions. 
To get a biologically plausible overall distribution for inherd prevalence, we allowed for 
an overlap of the two distributions by implementing the estimated maximal value for highly 
protected herds as the minimum value for poorly protected herds and vice versa. 
A mean inherd prevalence of 20% was reported in the Maastrich papers (Anonymous, 
1997). The model of Vonk Noordegraaf et. al. (1998) calculated national prevalence of gE-
positive cattle in equilibrium at 23% with average inherd prevalence in vaccinated herds at 
12% but inherd prevalence varied greatly between different herd types (Bosch et al., 
1998; Bosch et al., 1997). After discussion with the expert group we assumed the 
following values: For highly protected herds inherd prevalences from 0.1 % to 20% with a 
most likely value of 10% and for poorly protected herds, a most likely value of 50% within 
a range between 30% and 100%. This lead to the following Pert distributions, 
implementing the estimated values as suggested above: 
inherd prevalence for highly protected herd (Inherdprev_hp) 
  Minimum 0.1% 
  Most likely 10% 
  Maximum 30% 
inherd prevalence for poorly protected herd (Inherdprev_pp) 
  Minimum 20% 
  Most likely 50% 
  Maximum 100% 
For non-vaccinated herds (Inherdprev_nv) our experts expected the same inherd 
prevalence once the herd was infected as for poorly protected herds. 
Herd prevalence (Calculation for node 4) 
Herd level prevalence (HPrev) was calculated from apparent herd level incidence rate 
(Inc) and the duration until next testing (D) with the following formula (Thrusfield, 2005). 
Incidence rate was used since only certified BoHV-1 free herds were qualified for export to 
Switzerland. Therefore, not prevalence of infected herds in the country but number of 
newly infected herds between two sampling rounds was relevant to the model. This is 
consistent with the method suggested by the EFSA report on BoHV-1 free animals and 
establishments (Anonymous, 2005b). 
    HPrev = Inc * D 
Herd incidence (Input value for node 4) 
Apparent incidence rate (Inc) was modelled as a Gamma distribution. Data from our 
example region, Saxony-Anhalt, was 123 new positive within 2205 formerly negative 
herds in 2004 (Denzin and Ewert, 2005). Mean incidence was estimated at 5.7%. 
Incidence rate is by definition the proportion of newly infected herds to total herd years at 
risk (Thrusfield, 2005). Herd years at risk were calculated as follows: 
((2392 herds - 187 infected at beginning of year)+(2392 herds - 310 infected at end of year) / 2 
Saxony-Anhalt was chosen as an example region because an official eradication 
programme was implemented and there were vaccinated as well as non-vaccinated herds 
in the area. 
Surveillance programme in the country (Input value for node 4) 
The time between two sampling rounds in years (D) to calculate herd prevalence from 
herd incidence was derived from the regulations for the surveillance programme of the 
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country. In Saxony-Anhalt herds were sampled once a year to maintain their status 
(Denzin and Ewert, 2005). 
Relative risk of infection (Input value for node 4) 
The risk of being infected is relative to the age of the animal; therefore we defined a 
relative risk of being infected for animals within specified age classes. 
To calculate the relative risk of infection, we estimated prevalences for each age class. 
Boelaert reported 24% (CI 18-30), 29% (CI 22-36), 40% (CI 33-48), and 51% (CI 44-59) 
for the age classes Q1, Q2, Q3, and Q4 respectively (Boelaert, Speybroeck et al. 2005). 
This data refers to the Belgian cattle population and might not be representative for other 
countries relating to numbers. But we were only using the ratio between prevalences in 
the different age classes and we assumed comparable relations between age and 
prevalence for other European countries. 
We estimated prevalences as Beta distributions, using the RiskBetaGeneralAlt-function 
of @RISK that allows designing a Beta distribution by defining confidence interval and 
minimum and maximum value. To calculate relative risk per age class as a ratio of 
estimated prevalences we had to assure that estimated prevalence was not smaller than 
the prevalence of the next younger age class. This problem was solved by using an Excel 
If-function. The used distributions and the If-function are shown in Table XVI. 
Table XVI. Relative risks of infection for different age classes 
 Beta distribution for prevalence Control 
 2.5% 97.5% min max @RISK distribution: RiskBetaGeneralAlt If then 
Q1 0.18 0.30 0 1 (0.025;0.18;0.975;0.30;"min";0;"max";1) no If-function 
Q2 0.22 0.36 0 1 (0.025;0.22;0.975;0.36;"min";0;"max";1) Q2 < Q1 = Q1 
Q3 0.33 0.48 0 1 (0.025;0.33;0.975;0.48;"min";0;"max";1) Q3 < Q2 = Q2 
Q4 0.44 0.55 0 1 (0.025;0.44;0.975;0.55;"min";0;"max";1) Q4 < Q3 = Q3 
 
Per definition, relative risks are estimated from data or expert opinion and specified 
relative to the lowest risk branch (= relative risk of lowest branch is 1). We fixed the 
relative risk of being infected as 1 for Q1. The corresponding risk factors for the other age 
classes were then calculated as a proportion to rrQ1 by dividing the estimated prevalence 
for each age class by the prevalence estimated for Q1. 
rrQ2 = estimated prevalence in Q2 divided by estimated prevalence in Q1 
rrQ3 = estimated prevalence in Q3 divided by estimated prevalence in Q1 
rrQ4 = estimated prevalence in Q4 divided by estimated prevalence in Q1 
 
Adjusted risk of infection (Calculation for node 4) 
Relative risks, specified relative to the lowest risk branch, had to be adjusted to ensure 
that the weighted average risk for the reference population was 1 (Thrusfield, 2005). In 
our case, this meant  
        arQ1 * Q1 + arQ2 * Q2 + arQ3 * Q3 + arQ4 * Q4 = 1 
and adjusted risk = relative risk * adjusted risk for lowest risk branch 
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The inputs for the relative risk (rrQ1; rrQ2; rrQ3; rrQ4) for each age class were 
explained above. To calculate the adjusted risk for the respective age class (arQ1; arQ2; 
arQ3; arQ4), based on the proportion of animal present within each class, we used the 
following formulas. 
arQ1 = 1 / (Q1 + rrQ2 * Q2 + rrQ3 * Q3 + rrQ4 * Q4) 
arQ2 = rrQ2 * arQ1 and so on... 
3.6.4.5. Node 5: Seroconversion (Input value) 
There are cases reported in literature where infected animals did not seroconvert at all. 
These seronegative carriers were mostly due to infections when maternal antibodies were 
still present at high level. It is also most likely that there is biological variance between 
individuals and their immunological response. 
Hage et al. (1996) concluded from their experiments that cattle can be seronegative 
against gB and gE but still carry BoHV-1 in a latent form and suggested that there exist 
completely BoHV-1 seronegative animals that are latently infected. Five of the six 
investigated seronegative heifers that had been vaccinated in presence of maternal 
antibodies shed virus after dexamethasone treatment at the age of tree years. Toussaint 
et al. (2004) immunised twenty-four calves four times before challenge with small doses of 
BoHV-1. The five calves that shed virus after the challenge showed no delay in 
seroconversion compared to non-vaccinated controls. But nineteen calves, where strong 
immunity prevented detectable virus replication and gE-seroconversion, stayed negative. 
Using PCR, BoHV-1 could be detected in the trigeminal ganglia of seven of the gE-
seronegative, challenge-infected calves indicating that they were seronegative carriers 
(58% of at least twelve latently infected calves). 
On the other hand, Schynts et. al. (2001) found four of six calves possessing high 
levels of maternal antibodies from vaccinated cows positive against gE five weeks after 
low dose infection. But even with repeated dexamethasone treatment, virus could not be 
reactivated in the two gE-negative calves, and was not detected in the trigeminal ganglion. 
Furthermore, the animals also turned negative in the gB-ELISA once maternal antibodies 
faded out. This suggests, that the two calves were really uninfected. 
The experts agreed on the following probabilities based on literature. We assumed the 
same values for non-vaccinated animals as the effects of maternal antibodies were 
thought to be similar for calves from vaccinated and non-vaccinated cows. 
We are using a PERT DISTRIBUTION for probability of seroconversion (sero_gE; 
sero_gB) 
 minimum 95% 
 most likely 100% 
 maximum 100% 
 
3.6.4.6. Node 6: Seroconversion in 21 days (Calculation) 
The probability of seroconversion in an infected animal at time of testing abroad (stQ1; 
stQ2; stQ3; stQ4; stQ1nv; stQ2nv; stQ3nv; stQ4nv) was calculated. Cattle had to be 
separated for thirty days and tested for BoHV-1 at earliest after twenty-one days in 
separation in the country of origin. Animals that seroconverted before twenty-one days 
would therefore be detected anyway and sero_gE equaled 1. To account for this we used 
an If-function in excel. For animals that seroconverted more than twenty-one days after 
infection, we calculated the risk that it had been infected exactly within the last days 
before separation as follows: 
st = 1 - ((conv_gE - 21) / age) 
  
  68
This formula was based on the assumption of a daily risk of infection for each day in 
the life of a cattle which can be calculated as 1 divided by the age in days. This suggests 
that the risk of infection is constant for each day, which is certainly untrue. We justified this 
simplification with the assumption that the higher susceptibility in younger animals 
(especially before vaccination) and the augmented risk due to stress and handling in older 
animals equal each other.  
Using this simplification for the daily risk of infection allowed us to multiply the daily risk 
by the estimated days until seroconversion minus the twenty-one days until sampling to 
calculate the probability of testing an animal exactly within these critical days before 
seroconversion and therefore missing the infection. 
The age of the animal was derived as a cumulative distribution from the data set 
obtained from TVD. Data was divided according to the defined age classes, cumulative 
probabilities calculated within each class and a cumulative distribution derived as an 
estimate for age of the animal. The outcome was converted from months into days and 
rounded to full days (ageQ1, ageQ2, ageQ3, ageQ4). For age class Q1 we had to adjust for 
cases where age was smaller than time until seroconversion because an animal could not 
get infected before birth and in those cases probability for seroconversion before testing 
was zero. 
stQ1 (age>conv_gE;conv_gE>21)  = 1 - ((conf_gE - 21) / ageQ1) 
stQ2 (conv_gE>21) = 1 - ((conf_gE - 21) / ageQ2)  and so on... 
stQ1nv (age>conv_gB;conv_gE>21)  = 1 - ((conf_gB - 21) / ageQ1) 
stQ2nv (conv_gB>21) = 1 - ((conf_gB - 21) / ageQ2)  and so on... 
 
Days until seroconversion (Input value for node 6) 
For animals that do seroconvert, the number of days until detectable seroconversion 
after infection (conv_gE; conv_gB) was estimated as a Pert distribution. In experiments, 
most animals were tested positive for gE-antibodies two weeks after infection, latest 
reported after thirty-five days (Beer et al., 2003; Schynts et al., 2001). Seroconversion 
against gE in vaccinated animals always took a couple of days more than seroconversion 
in non-vaccinated animals. For non-vaccinated animals, a maximum of ten days was 
reported by Beer et. al. (2003). Kramps et al. (2004) described one case that was still 
negative on day eighteen after infection but positive after 1120 days. The other twenty-
three infected animals had all turned positive by day eleven. As we lacked of knowledge 
on the exact time of seroconversion of this one particular cattle, we assumed the same 
maximum for gB-antibodies as reported for gE.  
Antibodies against gB were first detected on day eight and nine, respectively (Beer et 
al., 2003; Kramps et al., 2004). For gE-antibodies Beer et al. (2003) reported a minimum 
of fourteen days, which is congruent with Kaashoek et. al. (1996). Unfortunately, in most 
gE-ELISA experiments, testing was only done once a week and therefore negative 
animals on day seven that where positive on day fourteen must have seroconverted 
anytime between eight and thirteen days. 
We used a PERT DISTRIBUTION for time until seroconversion after infection for  
vaccinated cattle: gE-antibodies (conv_gE)   
minimum 9 days 
most likely 14 days 
maximum 35 days 
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and for non-vaccinated cattle: gB-antibodies (conv_gB)  
minimum 8 days 
most likely 9 days 
maximum 35 days 
3.6.4.7. Node 7: Test abroad (Input value) 
Sensitivity of gE-ELISA (Input value for node 7: vaccinated animals) 
The marker diagnostic kits to detect antibodies against gE have been evaluated in an 
European trial and the EFSA-Opinion on BoHV-1 free establishments referred to these 
results (Kramps et al., 2004, Anonymous, 2005b).  
We used a PERT DISTRIBUTION for sensitivity of gE-blocking-ELISA (gE_ELISA) with 
 minimum 59% 
 most likely 72% 
 maximum 85% 
Sensitivity of gB-ELISA (Input value for node 7: non-vaccinated animals) 
The EFSA-Opinion on BoHV-1 free establishments recommended the use of gB-
ELISAs as the most sensitive screening test with better performance than other ELISAs 
detecting more or different antibodies (Anonymous, 2005b). Performance was also 
referred to Kramps et al. (2004). 
We used a PERT DISTRIBUTION for sensitivity of gB-blocking-ELISA (gB_ELISA) with 
 minimum 69% 
 most likely 96% 
 maximum 100% 
Specificity (Input value for node 7) 
Specificity was seen as 100% for the tests applied to the animal abroad and after 
separation in Switzerland, because positive test results would be further investigated with 
confirmatory tests. Only for the sentinel test in the destined Swiss herd specificity was 
taken into account, since a positive result in a sentinel animal, even if false positive, would 
lead to retesting of the imported animal and further investigation. 
3.6.4.8. Node 8: Separation group size (Input value) 
After import, cattle from not officially IBR-free countries were separated for three weeks 
and afterwards tested serologically. Specifications for proceeding animals from separation 
groups with seven or more animals (ov7) and from separation groups with less than seven 
animals (lo7) were different. In larger separation groups, group sensitivity enlarged the 
probability to detect the infection. In small groups, probability of detection was increased 
by testing the animal’s new herd mates in its destination establishment after another three 
weeks as sentinel animals. As we, in fact, had no knowledge on separation group sizes of 
cattle imports we assumed 50% of the animals in groups with less and more than seven 
animals, respectively (Knopf et. al., 2004. 
3.6.4.9. Node 9: Reactivation during import (Input value) 
The probability of reactivation in a latently infected animal during import and separation 
(rt) was estimated as a Pert distribution. Transportation and crowding means stress and 
might provoke a reactivation in latently infected animals as seen in the case of cattle 
import from France in 2005. But there were not many experiments on reactivation of  
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BoHV-1 in latently infected vaccinated cattle and the used model (dexamethasone 
treatment) simulated a very high level of stress (Tanaka, 2003).  
Vonk Noordegraaf et al. (1998) estimated in their model the probability of virus 
reactivation in a gE-positive animal upon transport, followed by transmission of the virus 
on the receiving farm, as 0.07. Kaashoek et. al. (1996) could reactivate latent infection in 
three out of four vaccinated animals (75%). Van Oirschot et al. (1996a) could provoke 
virus reactivation with dexamethasone in only one out of eight vaccinated calves (13%). 
Our conclusion after discussion with the experts was a PERT DISTRIBUTION for the 
probability of reactivation in vaccinated animal at import (rt) with 
 minimum 1% 
 most likely 13% 
 maximum 75% 
Non-vaccinated latently infected animals are much more likely to reactivate infection at 
import. We estimated a PERT DISTRIBUTION for rtNV with the opinion of our experts. 
 minimum 25% 
 most likely 50% 
 maximum 75% 
3.6.4.10. Node 10: Test CH (Calculation) 
Several points had to be taken into account concerning testing in Switzerland after 
three weeks of separation. If the latent infection was reactivated, separation group mates 
might be infected and therefore test sensitivity increased due to group sensitivity. On the 
other hand, without reactivation, the infected animal could only be identified by testing the 
animal itself and therefore, only single test sensitivity applied. 
In the current situation, the indirect ELISA was used in Switzerland. If cattle in 
separation abroad had been tested with gB-ELISA as recommended by EFSA 
(Anonymous, 2005b), the test in Switzerland had full sensitivity because there was no 
dependence. Should this situation change and Switzerland would adopt the gB-ELISA too, 
the test applied to the infected animal would be semi-dependent because it would be the 
same animal but four weeks later with the same test but a different batch in a different 
laboratory. For vaccinated animals, gE-ELISA was used on both occasions, therefore 
dependence between tests had to be taken into account. 
Group sensitivity for less than seven animals (Calculation for node 10) 
First we calculateed the effective number of animals in the group or, more precisely, 
the number of group mates of an infected animal. For the groups with less than seven 
animals we made the same assumption as Knopf et. al. (2004): 5% are groups with only 
one animal, 15% with three animals and 80% contain five animals. This lead to a 
cumulative probability for each situation of 0.05, 0.2, and 1, respectively. We modelled the 
number of group mates (lo7size) as a cumulative distribution with a minimum of zero and a 
maximum of six for an import group with seven or less animals. 
The model of Knopf et al. (2004) was used to calculate group sensitivity (GSe2_lo7; 
GSe2_lo7NV; GSe2_lo7VV) for each group size of herd mates in separation based on test 
sensitivity, transmission probabilities, and binomial distribution of infected group mates.  
Since the originally infected animal was retested, too, sensitivity of that test had to be 
added to the calculated group sensitivity to get the sensitivity for the whole group including 
the latently infected animal. For the formerly not infected group mates, the full sensitivity 
of the ELISA applied but for the formerly false negative animal, this sampling represented 
a second test. Since reactivation of the infection occurred in the animal and virus was 
shed between the two tests, we assumed a relevant change in its immunological situation 
and therefore independence between testing (full sensitivity of the ELISA).  
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vaccinated animal, group non-vaccinated: GSe2_lo7 = 1 - (1 - gE_ELISA) * (1 - GSe_lo7) 
all animals non-vaccinated: GSe2_lo7NV = 1 - (1 - gB_ELISA) * (1 - GSe_lo7NV) 
all animals vaccinated: GSe2_lo7VV = 1 - (1 - gB_ELISA) * (1 - GSe_lo7VV) 
Because we only used group sensitivity when reactivation of the latent infection in the 
originally infected animal had occurred, we could use the estimated value for virus 
transmission once the animal had reactivated (trans; transNV; transVV) for transmission 
probability. 
In case of no seroconversion in the originally infected animal (node 5), group sensitivity 
for separation herd mates was still applicable after reactivation and transmission 
(GSe_lo7; GSe_lo7NV; GSe_lo7VV).  
Group sensitivity for more than seven animals (Calculation) 
Differences in group sensitivities get smaller, the larger the group. Therefore, group 
sensitivities for larger groups (GSe2_ov7; GSe2_ov7NV; GSe2_ov7VV; GSe_ov7; 
GSe_ov7NV; GSe_ov7VV) were not calculated as detailed as for small ones. We used the 
same model as for small groups and calculated the values for GSe for seven, ten, and 
thirty animals, respectively, and implemented those values in a Pert distribution as 
minimal, most likely, and maximal value. These were just assumptions on group size of 
large import groups (min. 7, ml. 10, max. 30) since there was no available data. The 
minimal value was first estimated and then implemented as a fixed value of 99% to 
overcome calculation problems in Microsoft Excel. Several If-functions were used to 
assure that the most likely value was equal or smaller than the maximum value. 
Sensitivity of Bommeli ELISA (Input value for node 10) 
In Switzerland, for IBR screening, the indirect Bommeli ELISA (Checkit® Trachitest) 
was still in use. Its performance was estimated following Kramps et. al. (2004) and EFSA-
Opinion (Anonymous, 2005b). 
We used a PERT DISTRIBUTION for sensitivity of indirect ELISA (Se_Bom) with 
 minimum 69% 
 most likely 87% 
 maximum 94% 
Sensitivity of dependent test (Input value for node 10) 
The animals were first tested abroad after at least twenty-one days in separation and 
shipped about nine days later as separation was compulsory for thirty days. In 
Switzerland, the animals were kept separately for another twenty-one days before 
retesting (Anonymous, 2005d; Anonymous, 2004a).  
So the two ELISAs were only partially depending:  
- The same animal but four weeks later 
- Same test but different batch or same testing principle but from different producer 
- Different laboratory 
To calculate sensitivity of the second dependent test (Se2; Se2NV) it is recommended 
to calculate the proportion of positive results after prior false negatives (Thrusfield, 2005). 
Kramps et al. (2004) showed the results of different laboratories where all sera were 
tested twice. This approach showed complete dependence as the same sera were tested 
in the same lab at the same time.  
For the gE-ELISAs with samples known to be positive there were forty-four pairs with at 
least one negative or doubtful result. In eight of those cases, the second result was 
positive and infection would have been detected with the second test. This would lead to 
sensitivity for second test of 0.18. Only thirty-seven of the tests showed at least one 
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negative result and ten of them could have been detected, as the second result was either 
positive or doubtful. The proportion would therefore be 0.27.  
For gB-ELISA there were seventeen pairs with at least one negative or doubtful result 
of which five had a positive result and would have been detected with a probability of 0.29. 
Only eleven of them had actually at least one negative result and six could have been 
recognised due to a positive or doubtful second test result. This would lead to a sensitivity 
of second test of 0.55. 
We calculated confidence intervals for those estimates and modelled sensitivity of the 
second, dependent test as a Beta distribution using the RiskBetaGeneralAlt-function in 
@risk with 2.5% percentile, 97.5% percentile, minimum zero and as maximum the 
maximal value from the pert distribution estimating test sensitivity. Then we simulated the 
confidence interval values as uniform distributions, using the calculated values for both 
extremes (as explained above) as minimum and maximum. With those values we created 
a new Beta distribution for sensitivity of the second test, combining the two extremes 
using again the RiskBetaGeneralAlt-function in @risk. This was done for both, the 
gE_ELISA and the gB_ELISA and the obtained values are shown in Table XVII. 
Sensitivity of dependent test would be needed for non-vaccinated animals, if 
Switzerland would conduct a gB-ELISA. Presently, the indirect Bommeli ELISA (Checkit® 
Trachitest) for detection of the whole antibody spectrum, which represents not only a 
different test but also a different testing principle (indirect ELISA vs. blocking ELISA) was 
used. Therefore, sampling in Switzerland after three weeks was independent and had full 
sensitivity of indirect ELISA. For vaccinated animals, Switzerland would use a gE-ELISA, 
too, and therefore we had to account for test dependence concerning vaccinated animals, 
that have already seroconverted before test abroad (node 6) and without reactivation of 
infection at import (node 9). After reactivation and virus shedding, we assumed 
independence between tests as the immunological situation of the animal had changed. 
Table XVII. Submodel sensitivities: Values obtained for sensitivity of dependent tests 
Name Definition Formula 5th percentile median 95th percentile 
Se2 Sensitivity of second gE-ELISA, assuming test dependence 
Beta 
distribution 
from data 
12.3% 23.0% 36.4% 
Se2NV Sensitivity of second gB-ELISA, assuming test dependence 
Beta 
distribution 
from data 
77.0% 85.6% 91.8% 
 
3.6.4.11. Node 11: Reactivation at introduction (Input value equal to node 9) 
After separation, the imported cattle was introduced into a Swiss domestic herd. This 
required transportation and handling for integration of the animal into its new herd and 
could lead to reactivation of latent infection. 
The experts assessed the stress due to import as comparable to the stress at 
introduction into determined herd after separation in Switzerland. Therefore, for 
reactivation at introduction, we used the same input values as for node 9. But to account 
for different reactions of a single animal to the two stress situations, we modelled 
probability of reactivation at introduction (rt2; rt2NV) in a second simulation. 
3.6.4.12. Node 12: Test sentinels (Calculation) 
Group sensitivity for sentinel animals (Model output) 
In Switzerland, after introduction of the animal into its destined herd, cattle imported in 
groups smaller than seven animals were retested through a sentinel approach 
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(Anonymous, 2004e). Instead of retesting the imported animal (third test, same animal, 
large test dependence leads to low sensitivity), seven of the animal’s new herd mates 
were tested for IBR after at least four weeks but not the animal itself. Sensitivity of the 
sentinella-testing (SentSe, SentSeNV) equaled group sensitivity for seven group mates as 
showed for node 10 but was only relevant if reactivation of latent infection in the infected 
animal had occurred after introduction into its new herd (rt2; rt2NV). The values obtained 
for group sensitivity of seven herd mates are shown in Table XVIII. 
Group specificity for sentinel animals (Calculation from input value) 
Only for the sentinel test in the destined Swiss herd specificity was taken into account, 
since a positive result, even if false positive, would lead to retesting of the imported animal 
and further investigation. 
To calculate group specificity for sentinel test, specificity was estimated following 
Kramps et al. (2004) and EFSA-Opinion (Anonymous, 2005b). 
We used a PERT DISTRIBUTION for specificity of indirect ELISA (Sp_Bom) with 
 minimum 88% 
 most likely 99% 
 maximum 100% 
For the gB-ELISA (SentSp_gB), Kramps reported the same specificity values as for the 
indirect ELISA. 
Then, group specificity for sentinel test of 7 non-vaccinated Swiss herd mates, was 
calculated for use of Bommeli ELISA (SentSp_Bom) or gB-ELISA (SentSp_gB): 
SentSp_Bom = (specificity Bommeli)7 
SentSp_gB = (specificity gB-ELISA)7 
Table XVIII. Test sentinels: Expected value for sensitivity and specificity 
Name Definition Formula 5
th 
percentile median 
95th 
percentile 
SentSe 
Sensitivity of testing seven 
sentinel animals after reactivation 
at introduction in infected animal 
model Knopf:
7 herd mates 99.98% 99.9999% 100% 
SentSp 
Specificity of testing seven 
sentinel animals (if infected 
animal did not reactivate) 
(specificity) 7 63.24% 85.10% 97.83% 
3.6.4.13. Node 13: Reactivation lifetime (Input value) 
The probability of reactivation in a latently infected animal at any point in the life of a 
breeding or dairy cattle (r) was estimated by experts at 100% (Ackermann, M., Swiss 
reference laboratory for IBR, personal communication). We assumed for the lifetime of a 
cattle that there would always be at least once a stress factor strong enough to reactivate 
infection. Furthermore, in vaccinated animals the vaccination would no longer be boosted 
and immunity would probably fade out. Stress factors are, for example, parturition, 
crowding, transport, diseases, medical treatment and handling. On the other hand, the 
animal might died due to any reason and therefore did not reactivate infection within 
lifetime. To account for those cases and to get a biologically plausible input in absence of 
reliable data, we used a Uniform distribution with 
 Minimum 95% 
 Maximum 100% 
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3.6.4.14. Node 14: Transmission (Input value) 
The probability of virus transmission to a naïve herd mate once the infection was 
reactivated (trans) was estimated as a Pert distribution. This was difficult because 
common experimental design involved either vaccinated or non-vaccinated cattle. Mixture 
of both was not part of any eradication programme specially not because the goal of 
vaccination was to reach a high protection on herd level rather than on single animal level. 
R0 for non-vaccinated animals was estimated at 5.6 (Bosch et al., 1997), so if once one 
domestic animal was infected a major outbreak among our naïve population would be 
most likely. Hage et al. (1996) estimated R0 as 7 in their population dynamics of BoHV-1 
trial. Bosch et al. (1997) found in their experiments with different vaccines R0 values from 
0.9 for live vaccines up to 2.6 for inactivated vaccines. Vonk Noordegraaf et al. (1998) 
used a value of 1.5 for herds vaccinated with live vaccines in their model because in the 
field animals might get infected before they are effectively immunised. As mentioned 
above, they also estimated the probability of a latently infected, vaccinated cattle to 
reactivate and transmit the virus to another herd mate at 0.07. Within the present model 
this value would represent rt multiplied by trans. Using this value as a minimum because 
it referred to transmission from vaccinated to vaccinated animal we calculated 0.54 for 
trans (using the most likely value o 0.13 for rt). Obviously, transmission to naive contact 
animals is much more likely and based on the high R0 values for non-vaccinated animals 
we assumed a most likely probability for transmission of 100%. 
Probability of transmission of virus from vaccinated to non-vaccinated cattle (trans) was 
estimated as PERT DISTRIBUTION with 
 minimum 54% 
 most likely 100% 
 maximum 100% 
Based on the high values for R0 for non-vaccinated animals and expert opinion we 
fixed transNV at 100%.  
Transmission probability from vaccinated to vaccinated animal (transVV) was 
estimated, too, to be able to adjust the model for a whole group of vaccinated animals 
imported. As a first step, the model represented the situation of importing only one 
vaccinated cattle within an import group of non-vaccinated animals. This was reasonable, 
because animals from different herds are often gathered at one collecting establishment 
for separation before shipping and, mainly in France, heterogenous herds with vaccinated 
and non-vaccinated individuals exist (Anonymous, 2005c). In the following, the scenario of 
importing a whole group of vaccinated animals was simulated too. 
3.7. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
The impact of variables on the outcome for both models was analysed using tornado 
charts based on calculated regression coefficients. Tornado charts provide a pictorial 
representation to illustrate sensitivity analysis of the models. The charts show to what 
degree individual variables influence the model output. The bar length represents the 
degree of association. The larger it is, the more is the respective input variable affecting 
the output (Vose, 2003). Positive and negative associations are indicated by the direction 
of the bar. Positive associated variables increase the model output while negative 
associated ones decrease it, when the variable itself becomes larger. 
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Chapter 4 Results 
An important output of this project were the developed models described in Chapter 3. 
In this section, we present the output values derived from these models. All designations 
used for the variables in the tables and charts are defined in Tables 5 and 13.  
4.1. MODEL OUTPUT 
4.1.1. Aujeszky’s disease 
After one simulation with 106 iterations and input values as presented in chapter 3.5, 
we obtained the following outputs for the probability of introducing AD through the import 
of one pig. Medians as well as 5th and 95th percentiles are shown. 
 Marker-vaccinated pig 4.93 x 10-4  ( 5.83 x 10-5  -   1.60 x 10-3 ) 
 Non-vaccinated pig 4.73 x 10-7  ( 4.92 x 10-8 -   1.88 x 10-6 ) 
This means that if one vaccinated pig is imported, on average one can be 99.95% 
confident that it would not introduce AD into Switzerland. In case of repeated imports, an 
undesired outcome would occur in roughly 5 out of 10,000 cases. For non-vaccinated 
animals, the mean value was 99.9999%. 
The results indicate a 1000-fold lower probability for non-vaccinated animals. 
Distributions for the output values are shown in Figures 18, 19 and 20 as ascending 
cumulative frequency plots. They show the probability of the output being less than or 
equal to the x-axis value (Vose, 2003). In Figure 17 the values are presented graphically 
for comparison.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17.  Obtained values for the probability of introduction of AD into Switzerland by 
one single imported pig 
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Figure 18.  Cumulative distribution of the probability of AD introduction in a vaccinated pig 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19.  Cumulative distribution of the probability of AD introduction in a non-vaccinated pig 
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4.1.2. Infectious bovine rhinotracheitis 
After one simulation with 106 iterations and input values as presented in Chapter 3, we 
obtained the following outputs for the probability of introducing IBR through the import of 
one cattle. Mean values as well as 5th and 95th percentiles are shown. 
Marker-vaccinated cattle 
 - group mates non-vaccinated 2.40 x 10-3  ( 1.23 x 10-3  -   4.39 x 10-3 ) 
 - whole group vaccinated 2.47 x 10-3  ( 1.27 x 10-3  -   4.51 x 10-3 ) 
Non-vaccinated cattle 1.78 x 10-4  ( 8.38 x 10-5 -   8.01 x 10-4 ) 
Therefore, importing one vaccinated cattle from a country not free from IBR would be 
associated with a 99.76% confidence of not introducing IBR into Switzerland under current 
risk management measures. This indicates that if 1000 animals were imported, the 
disease would be introduced on average on approx. 2 occasions. The difference between 
the import of a single vaccinated cattle in a group of non-vaccinated animals and the 
import of an entire group of vaccinated cattle is negligible. For the import of non-
vaccinated cattle, the average value was 99.98%. 
This represented a 13-fold higher risk for vaccinated animals than for non-vaccinated 
animals. Distributions for the output values are shown in Figures 21 and 22 as ascending 
cumulative frequency plots. They show the probability of the output being less than or 
equal to the x-axis value (Vose, 2003). In Figure 20 the output values are presented 
graphically.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20.  Obtained values for the probability of introduction of IBR into Switzerland by 
one single imported cattle 
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Figure 21.  Cumulative distribution of the probability of IBR introduction in one vaccinated cattle 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 22.  Cumulative distribution of the probability of IBR introduction in one non-vaccinated cattle  
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4.2. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
4.2.1. Aujeszky’s disease 
The tornado graph for the output value for a vaccinated pig is shown in Figure 23. Herd 
level prevalence in the exporting country had the largest effect on the output for 
vaccinated pigs. The number of days it took the animal to seroconvert against gE after 
infection was also important. These variables were all positively associated, i.e. if their 
value increased, the model output increased too. Similar impact had inherd prevalence in 
poorly protected herds, the proportion of herds being highly protected, the age of the 
animal, and transmission probability to a Swiss herd mate. Inherd prevalence and 
transmission probability were positively associated while the proportion of highly protected 
herds and the age of the pig were negatively associated. Smaller impact had inherd 
prevalence in highly protected herds, which was positively associated, and sensitivity of 
gE-ELISA, which was negatively associated. The probability of reactivation once in a 
lifetime in latently infected animals, the specificity of gE-ELISA, and the probability of 
clinical signs after reactivation had only a very small effect on the outcome. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 23.  Regression sensitivity for a vaccinated pig (Standard b coefficient) 
 
Figure 24 shows the tornado graph for the output value for a non-vaccinated pig. For 
non-vaccinated animals, too, herd level prevalence in the exporting country had the 
highest positively associated impact on the output. The second relevant input value was 
the probability of reactivation during separation in Switzerland, which was negatively 
associated. For a non-vaccinated pig, in contrast to the model for vaccinated pigs, test 
sensitivity was relevant as a negatively associated variable. Inherd prevalence and 
number of days until seroconversion had about the same positively associated impact, 
followed by the age of the animal at time of import with negative correlation. As for 
vaccinated animals, the probability of reactivation once in a lifetime in latently infected 
animals and test specificity had only a small effect on the outcome. 
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Figure 24.  Regression sensitivity for a non-vaccinated pig (Standard b coefficient) 
4.2.2. Infectious bovine rhinotracheitis 
The tornado graph for vaccinated cattle is shown in Figure 25. Inherd prevalence in 
poorly protected herds and sensitivity of gE-ELISA had the highest impact on the output 
for vaccinated animals in a separation group with non-vaccinated animals. Inherd 
prevalence in poorly protected herds was positively associated while test sensitivity was 
negatively associated. A lower and approximately equal influence on the output resulted 
from the proportion of poorly protected herds, the probability of reactivation in separation 
in Switzerland, the incidence rate in the exporting country, and the sensitivity of test in 
Switzerland. Except for the probability of reactivation in separation, which was negatively 
associated, they were all positively associated with the model output. Transmission 
probability, specificity of indirect ELISA, and probability of reactivation at introduction into 
the Swiss herd had less impact on the model output. Again, reactivation probability was 
associated negatively while transmission probability and specificity of the test in 
Switzerland were positively associated. Probability of seroconversion, age of animals from 
age class 1, which were negatively associated, and reactivation once in a lifetime, which 
was positively associated, had a small effect. The number of group mates and days until 
seroconversion against gE had no effect. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 25.  Regression sensitivity for a vaccinated cattle in a non-vaccinated group (Std b coeff) 
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For vaccinated animals in a separation group with vaccinated cattle, the sensitivity 
ranking was very similar to animals in a group of non-vaccinated cattle except for a 
reduced effect of reactivation at import. Furthermore, group sensitivity had a small effect 
on the output. Further details are therefore omitted but the tornado chart is shown in 
Figure 26. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 26.  Regression sensitivity for a vaccinated cattle in a vaccinated group (Standard b coefficient) 
 
For a non-vaccinated animal, the tornado chart is shown in Figure 28. For these 
animals, the sensitivity of gB-ELISA abroad was the most influential input variable with 
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probability. While reactivation and number of group mates in separation as well as age for 
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probability were positive. Reactivation once in a lifetime and number of days until 
seroconversion had only a small effect on the model output. 
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Figure 27.  Regression sensitivity for a non-vaccinated cattle (Standard b coefficient) 
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Chapter 5 Discussion 
5.1. SOURCES OF INFORMATION FOR THE PRESENTED MODELS 
Data from literature was used whenever possible to estimate model inputs, but great 
uncertainty existed, as it is difficult to extrapolate experimental data to the field or to apply 
results from one country or region to the population of another. Furthermore, for some 
parameters no literature data was available at all. We therefore decided to combine 
literature data with expert opinion. 
We are aware that eliciting expert opinion after initially suggesting the values leads to a 
tendency to agree with the subjective opinion drawn from literature by the risk assessor. 
On the other hand, as shown by psychological research, human behaviour leads to bias in 
any case, especially when simply asking an individual to provide a probability. The 
methods of reasoning, or heuristics, employed when generating subjective estimates 
consistently introduces biases which can be quite large, regardless whether the individual 
is experienced in making estimates and is familiar with probability theory or is a novice in 
this field (Merkhofer and Keeney, 1987). Our eliciting process clearly avoids the 
individual’s tendency to weight information, but the suggestion itself as made by the risk 
assessor may already be influenced by small unrepresentative sets of data with which he 
or she is familiar. Other sources of bias in the experts’ estimates, but also already in the 
initial suggestion by the risk assessor, may be the human tendency to be overconfident 
and estimate uncertainty too narrowly, to resist changing one’s mind in the face of new 
information, and to try to influence decisions and outcomes by casting beliefs in a 
particular direction. Nevertheless, our method of combining literature research with an 
expert consensus led to plausible estimates for our model inputs. 
We opted for a small number of experts in order to enable a consensus process in 
estimating the values. With a large group of experts, this would have been impractical, 
and it would have been necessary to combine several estimates, which is a 
methodological problem in itself, although methods are described in the literature to derive 
distributions even from contrary expert opinions and to deal with many different estimates 
(Anonymous, 2004d). In the future, input values of these models can be changed as soon 
as further knowledge becomes available. 
5.2. MODELLING APPROACH 
We consider the models to be a practicable and sound tool to conduct quantitative 
import risk assessments with regard to BoHV1 and AD introduction via marker-vaccinated 
animals. The models consider all relevant risk factors known to date and, although the 
models are characterised by a remarkable level of complexity, sufficient flexibility was 
maintained to enable translation to other infectious disease agents. Consequently, they 
are very useful to investigate possible existing and future import risks.  
The weakness of both models is the unknown factor of herd prevalence in the 
exporting country. Since this had a strong influence but varies between different regions, 
no general statement can be made for an arbitrary animal from anywhere in Europe. 
However, both models allow the comparison between risks in vaccinated and non-
vaccinated animals coming from a particular country or zone. A relative comparison was 
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possible as long as the same herd level prevalences were assumed for vaccinated and 
non-vaccinated herds. With different herd level prevalences, as used for the AD model, 
the difference in herd level prevalences became the most effecting factor for the ratio 
between the results for a vaccinated and a non-vaccinated pig. 
For the AD model, the Bayes model for sensitivity and specificity of gE-ELISA must be 
considered non-standard. In a next step, it could be useful to confirm the results by using 
a standard approach, such as WinBugs. On the other hand, the pooled estimator (sum of 
all true positives divided by sum of truly infected) yielded values for point estimate and 
variance estimate of sensitivity similar to the results of the Bayes model but within a 
smaller confidence interval. Additionally, it is questionable whether it is appropriate to use 
two different approaches to estimate sensitivity and specificity of gE-ELISA (Bayes model) 
and of PRV-ELISA (pert distribution). But since sensitivity analysis showed that test 
sensitivity had only a small effect on the outcome, there is no immediate need for further 
investigation.  
The weakness of the IBR model is due to uncertainty factors related to test 
dependence, group size, and behaviour of the virus in mixed populations with vaccinated 
and non-vaccinated animals. The latter had only a small impact, but test dependence 
proved to be crucial for the output. Our approach to obtain an estimate for test 
dependence is rudimentary and certainly not a standard procedure. But since no further 
information was available, only a rough estimate could be produced that requires further 
investigation. To implement the model, it has to be clearly established which tests are 
used in Switzerland, because currently the indirect ELISA is used in Switzerland while for 
Europe, gB-ELISA is recommended by the EFSA. Therefore, under current procedures, 
there is no test dependence for non-vaccinated animals. However, the national reference 
laboratory is considering the adoption of European standards in the near future (Engels, 
M., Swiss reference laboratory for IBR, personal communication). This would require a 
change in model input for the second test, taking into account test dependence. 
Therefore, more research concerning test dependence would be of great benefit for 
obtaining more reliable results. For group sensitivities, the model might be too detailed, 
but the submodel for group sensitivity in separation was already available at SFVO, so we 
decided to include it into our model. 
For both models, it would be helpful to have more information on the reactivation of 
latent infection over time, because sensitivity analysis showed a high impact for the values 
concerning reactivation at different points in the model. It is known that reactivation is 
possible and very likely to happen at some time in the life of a latently infected animal, but 
this knowledge is not sufficient to model precise probabilities for reactivation within given 
time periods between testing. However, no data on these aspects was available and the 
inputs are pure expert estimates. 
5.2.1. Interpretation of the model outputs 
All values discussed in this section are median values, and the values in brackets 
represent their 5th and 95th percentile, respectively. 
The outputs obtained from our models can be interpreted in two ways. Firstly, they 
provide estimates for the probability of introduction of AD and IBR into Switzerland as 
defined in chapter 3. Secondly, they make it possible to compare the risks related to 
vaccinated and non-vaccinated animals. Because the output values are strongly 
influenced by the prevalence of infection in the exporting country, the quantitative 
estimates apply only to the individual situations in our example regions, Spain for AD and 
Saxony-Anhalt for IBR, respectively. But the ratio between the probabilities of introduction 
through vaccinated and non-vaccinated animals derived from the model is assumed to be 
applicable to other regions, too. 
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In the EFSA opinion on IBR-free animals and establishments, the AHAW panel 
concluded that because of the mentioned dependence on the a-priori probability of 
infection in the country of origin, there was no single definition of a BoHV-1 free animal. 
They recommended to determine an acceptable probability for an undetected infected 
animal and then combine the a-priori probability of infection with the quality parameters of 
the testing protocol to reach the defined threshold (Anonymous, 2005a). This is more or 
less what has been done in the presented model for IBR. The obtained results only apply 
to Saxony-Anhalt, but the model provides a tool to calculate estimates for any region as 
soon as the incidence in the area is known. 
The results concerning AD and the import of live pigs from Spain showed for one 
vaccinated pig a 99.95% (99.99 - 99.84) probability of not introducing the disease. Even if 
this seems to be quite safe, the total number of imported animals needs to be considered. 
For example, if the number of imported animals is 100, average confidence decreases to 
95.19% (99.42 - 85.24). Stated in different terms, if 100 pigs are imported annually, the 
disease would be introduced 5 times in 100 years. By contrast, for non-vaccinated pigs, 
confidence is nearly 100% (99.98 - 99.99995), and it would still be 99.99% for the import 
of 100 pigs. This indicates that when importing 100 non-vaccinated animals per year, the 
disease would be introduced on average less than once in a century.  
For IBR, the probability was much higher than for AD. The main reasons are the higher 
prevalences used for IBR, the poorer test performances of the IBR ELISAs and the higher 
age of traded cattle compared to traded breeding pigs. For a single vaccinated cattle, 
average confidence was 99.76% (99.56 - 99.88); in other words, approx. 2 out of 1000 
imported animals are infected and not detected by sanitary measures. For 100 animals, 
confidence decreases to 78.65% (64.39 - 88.41) on average, and for 1200 vaccinated 
cattle to only 5.60% (0.50 - 23.67). This means that on average, the disease would be 
introduced 21 times in 100 years if 100 animals are imported annually, and if 1200 
vaccinated cattle are imported per year – as imported in 2005 – it would be almost certain 
for the disease to be introduced through at least one animal. 
For non-vaccinated cattle, average confidence was 99.98% (99.95 - 99.996), indicating 
that roughly 2 out of 10'000 imported animals would introduce the disease. For the import 
of 100 animals, we can be 98.23% (94.98 - 99.56) confident of not introducing the 
disease, i.e. at an annual import rate of 100 animals, an undesired outcome would occur 
on average in 2 out of 100 years. For the import of 1200 non-vaccinated cattle from 
countries not free from disease, confidence is 80.74% (53.90 - 94.85), which means that 
at an annual import rate of 1200 cattle for 100 years, IBR would be introduced once every 
5 years. These results clearly justify the targeting of Swiss establishments with imported 
animals in next year’s annual risk-based national survey for IBR.  
The AHAW panel recommends that an animal free from BoHV-1, unless coming from a 
free zone, should have a probability of at least 99.98% of not being infected. According to 
the report, this figure was obtained for a region with a prevalence of 10% by subjecting the 
animal to two tests, one at entry and one after at least 21 days of quarantine. However, 
the calculation did not take into account the probability of rare cases of animals that do not 
seroconvert and thus pose a risk for importing the infection. Furthermore, no dependence 
was assumed between the two tests (Anonymous, 2005b). The probability calculated with 
our model does not correspond exactly to the threshold recommended by the EFSA, 
because it also included reactivation probabilities, the testing scenario in Switzerland after 
import, and the probability of transmission to a Swiss herd mate. Nevertheless, the results 
should be roughly in the same range because in both cases, the animals are tested twice 
and the results depend on the prevalence in the exporting country and on test 
performance.  
Our model showed exactly the required 99.98% for the probability of the animal not 
harbouring BoHV-1 when separation after import is suspended. But if we change the input 
values for the model according to the assumptions made in the EFSA report, assuming a 
probability of seroconversion of 100% and independence between tests, we obtain similar 
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probabilities. Should the EU adopt the EFSA recommendations and require two tests 
during quarantine abroad, a probability of 99.992% or greater could be reached provided 
that testing after import in Switzerland is continued. The model shows that currently, cattle 
arriving at the Swiss border from countries not free from IBR after undergoing one test in 
quarantine do not meet the recommended criterion of a 99.98% probability of not being 
infected. Only additional measures applied in Switzerland during separation can provide a 
sufficient probability of not introducing the infection.  
The finding that vaccinated animals generally represent a higher risk of introducing the 
disease than non-vaccinated animals is consistent with other findings in modelling and 
risk assessment. Graat et al. (2001) found the vaccination status to be the strongest factor 
for modelling R0 between herds in an IBR surveillance programme, and the scientific 
report by the EFSA also documents a lower probability of disease freedom for vaccinated 
animals (Anonymous, 2005b). The differences are due to the lower test performance of 
the gE-ELISAs, the lower probability of clinical signs in vaccinated animals, and the lower 
reactivation and transmission rates. 
5.2.2. Sensitivity analysis 
Understanding how the output is affected by the model’s input variables is useful for 
analysing the results and refining the model if appropriate. Variables with large impact on 
the outcome can be revalidated and adjusted while variables that have only a small 
impact may be neglected. @RISK offers comprehensive statistical report options to 
facilitate result interpretation as well as graphical illustration capabilities. We used tornado 
charts to conduct our sensitivity analysis. 
Tornado charts based on step-wise regression as presented in section 4.2 must be 
interpreted with caution. Since they illustrate the degree to which the uncertainty of the 
output is affected by the uncertainty of the individual variables, they do not account for 
fixed parameters that may also affect the results. The impact of parameters with only a 
small variation might be underestimated as well. Step-wise regression is performed for 
each input value using the data obtained from the iterations. Only large differences in 
coefficients indicate greater or smaller effects, whereas for input values with similar 
coefficients, the ranking might change for each simulation (@RISK manual). Additionally, 
it makes sense to limit the number of variables represented in the plot (Vose, 2003). 
In both models, presence of the disease in the exporting country as well as in the 
establishment of origin (inherd prevalence / proportion of highly protected vaccinated 
herds) had an effect on the output. This means that a higher disease prevalence in the 
exporting country increases the probability of introduction in imported animals irrespective 
of test performance. This finding is consistent with the opinion published by the AHAW 
panel (Anonymous, 2005a). 
For AD, herd level prevalence was the most important input value. Since we chose 
different inputs for vaccinated and non-vaccinated herds, there was a large difference 
between the outputs for a vaccinated and a non-vaccinated pig. By using the same herd 
level prevalence for both types of herds, the probability of introduction for vaccinated 
animals was only 2.9-fold higher than for non-vaccinated animals, which is more 
consistent with the ratio obtained for vaccinated and non-vaccinated cattle in the IBR 
model. On the other hand, it seemed reasonable to interpret the data differently for 
vaccinated and non-vaccinated herds, as an outbreak of clinical disease after the 
introduction of PRV is very likely in non-vaccinated seronegative herds. We regard the 
occurrence of clinical symptoms as an additional possible detection method for non-
vaccinated herds and therefore assume a smaller prevalence of infected but not detected 
herds than in vaccinated ones. 
Since pigs are only tested once for AD, which is during separation abroad, the question 
whether the animal has already seroconverted at time of testing had an important effect 
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on the outcome for a vaccinated pig. A newly infected pig that would seroconvert later will 
not be detected. As a consequence, the number of days until seroconversion was highly 
positively associated. The longer it takes for the animal to seroconvert, the higher the 
chance that it will be tested before seroconversion. For non-vaccinated animals, time until 
seroconversion is shorter than for vaccinated animals, therefore, fewer animals are likely 
to be tested before seroconversion, and the probability of seroconversion had a smaller 
effect than in the model for vaccinated pigs. As we used the estimated age of the pig to 
calculate the probability of seroconversion, it was not surprising that age had also an 
effect on the output. It was negatively associated, which can be explained by the fact that 
the calculation for the daily risk of infection was derived from dividing one by age. It 
followed that, the younger the pig, the larger was its daily risk of infection. 
For a non-vaccinated pig, the probability of reactivation of a latent infection during 
separation in Switzerland was crucial because the probability of clinical signs after 
reactivation was always 100% and would lead to detection of the infected animal. It was 
strongly negatively associated, indicating that the higher the probability of reactivation at 
import, the higher the probability of detecting the infection by clinical signs during 
separation and therefore the smaller the probability of introducing AD into Switzerland 
(model output). On the other hand, for vaccinated animals, the role of reactivation at 
import was negligible as clinical signs are very unlikely. However, the probability of clinical 
signs, even when very small, had a negatively associated effect on disease detection and 
therefore on model output. The effects of reactivation once in a lifetime and of test 
specificity was very small due to their narrow ranges and their large values close to 100%. 
Test sensitivity also affected the output of the AD model. It was larger for non-
vaccinated animals, which may be due to the wider range in the input for sensitivity of 
PRV-ELISA compared to the values derived from the Bayes model. As expected, the 
correlation was negative. Since virus excretion is reduced in vaccinated pigs, virus 
transmission to its Swiss herd mates had some positively associated effect on the output 
as well. For a non-vaccinated pig, virus transmission was estimated to be 100%, 
indicating that only reactivation affected the output whereas transmission was certain to 
occur once the infection has been reactivated. 
For the IBR model, we used the same input data for disease presence in the exporting 
country for vaccinated and non-vaccinated herds, mainly because more detailed 
information was not available. As a result, incidence as a basis to calculate herd 
prevalence had a smaller effect on the IBR model than herd prevalence for AD. This might 
be one reason why the differences in the probabilities of introduction between vaccinated 
and non-vaccinated cattle are quite small. The use of the same incidence values for 
vaccinated and non-vaccinated herds is subject to the same critical arguments as 
mentioned above with respect to AD.  
The much more complicated import scenario for cattle with several tests performed on 
the animal explains the importance of the different test performance input values. Test 
sensitivity was one of the factors with the largest effects in the IBR model. The sensitivity 
of the second test was also crucial since the test performed in Switzerland must be 
regarded as dependent to some extent. On the other hand, the probability of animals not 
seroconverting affected the model output because these animals cannot be detected by 
testing. Obviously, since a detected animal does not introduce the disease, all inputs that 
affect the detection probability of an animal are negatively associated. 
For group sensitivity in separation and in sentinel animals, the probability of 
reactivation during separation and at introduction into a Swiss herd and the probability of 
virus transmission as well as the number of group mates are important. Reactivation was 
negatively associated since the detection probability increases if the animal infects its 
group mates. On the other hand, transmission probability was positively associated, 
indicating that transmission to Swiss herd mates makes disease introduction more likely. 
We regard the lower probability of reactivation and of virus transmission as one of the 
main reasons for the differences in model output for vaccinated and non-vaccinated cattle. 
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Additionally, reactivation during separation also had an effect on the model since we 
considered animals with a reactivated infection as serologically different from before and 
assumed full test sensitivity again for a second test. Because the sentinel animals 
represented the last opportunity to detect the disease, the specificity of the sentinel test 
had some effect if no virus is transmitted to the sentinels. Thus, a false positive result 
would prompt further investigation not only in sentinels but also in the imported animal. 
The higher the specificity, the lower the chance to detect the infected animal accidentally 
due to a false negative result in a sentinel animal. It was therefore positively associated. 
The probability of reactivation once in a lifetime and the number of days until 
seroconversion had only a very small effect on the model output. 
5.2.3. Different scenarios 
For the import of pigs, additional sanitary measures are easy to implement. The 
animals are so far only tested once but kept in separation in Switzerland, including blood 
sampling for other diseases. To obtain greater confidence when importing vaccinated 
animals, a second test could be performed in Switzerland. By introducing test sensitivity 
rather than probability of clinical signs in vaccinated animals into the model, the chance of 
detecting a latently infected animal increased and confidence could be improved to 
99.996% (99.987 - 99.9997), which comes close to the safety level for a non-vaccinated 
pig. Assuming the same herd level prevalence for vaccinated and non-vaccinated herds, 
the probability of introducing the infection became even lower for vaccinated animals than 
for non-vaccinated animals if a second test was performed on the vaccinated ones. This 
underscores to the large effect of disease presence in the exporting country, which 
requires thorough consideration before import regulations are devised. 
For IBR, many measures have already been implemented, and it is difficult to imagine 
additional useful test methods. Because of test dependence, performing a third test on the 
animal itself would not yield much more information. On the other hand, testing sentinel 
animals may not be very helpful in detecting latently infected vaccinated animals because 
they are not very likely to reactivate the infection or to transmit virus after reactivation. In 
the case of vaccinated animals, one possible suggestion is therefore to retest the animal 
itself by a third test after a reasonable interval instead of testing sentinel animals.  
Another possibility to detect latent infection in vaccinated (and non-vaccinated) animals 
would be a treatment with dexamethasone to reactivate infection, followed by virus 
isolation from nasal swabs. However, this scenario appears not very practicable because 
it would require isolation throughout the test period, which is expensive. Moreover, the 
scenario is questionable for medical and animal welfare reasons. 
Since transmission probability and group sensitivity in separation affected the model 
output, we calculated the output in case of one vaccinated animal within a non-vaccinated 
separation group and, additionally, for the situation of a whole group of imported 
vaccinated animals. Animals imported in groups of vaccinated cattle have a slightly higher 
probability of introducing the disease, but the differences between outputs were minimal. 
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5.3. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DECISION-MAKERS 
Results of our models do not justify the recommendation of the import of pigs that are 
marker-vaccinated against AD. Since the results were strongly dependent on herd level 
prevalence in the exporting country, solutions should be found to deal with this issue. It 
may not be sensible to divide exporting countries merely into free and not free. It should 
be considered whether it is legally possible to differentiate infected countries on the basis 
of actual prevalences. Thereafter, cut-off values for herd level prevalence could be 
defined using the presented models. Should the import of vaccinated animals appear 
desirable under such circumstances, a second gE-ELISA during separation in Switzerland 
is strongly recommended. Other possible methods to reduce the risk might be a prolonged 
quarantine abroad for vaccinated animals. Since in our model the exporting country tested 
its herds every four months, requirements for further herd testing do not seem reasonable. 
However, restrictions concerning sample size or time after the last test in the 
establishment of origin may further decrease the risk. 
For IBR, the differences between the probabilities of introducing the disease through 
vaccinated and non-vaccinated animals are not as large as for AD but large enough to 
justify import restrictions on vaccinated animals. This is consistent with the 
recommendations in the EFSA opinion (Anonymous, 2005a). However, it must be kept in 
mind that our model assumed the same herd level prevalence for vaccinated and non-
vaccinated herds, which might not be realistic. The same arguments as outlined above for 
pig herds, albeit with a smaller impact, must be considered with regard to the risk of not 
detecting a newly infected herd. 
New requirements for pre-shipment testing in the exporting country should be 
implemented as recommended by the EFSA, because under the current protocol, animals 
do not attain the necessary 99.98% probability of not being infected at shipment. In 
quarantine, two tests should be performed on the animals, one at entry and one after at 
least 21 days (Anonymous, 2005b). However, to obtain more reliable results, the values 
for test dependence and the probabilities of reactivation at different stages need to be 
further investigated and validated.  
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